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Pesticide use is one of the great evils of the modem environmental
movement.' Pesticides threatened a "Silent Spring" in Rachel Carson's 1962
book of the same name2 by removing song birds from American towns.
Carson's book was enormously influential-former Vice President Al Gore,
for example, cited it as an important part of his environmental awakening in
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I See BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST 215 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2001) (1998) ("This message has been the legacy of Carson and has remained one of the
major underpinnings of the environmental movement: our fear of chemicals."); id. at 226
(reporting that "75 percent of all Americans are extremely concerned or very concerned
about pesticides").
2 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 103 (1962).
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his campaign manifesto, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human
Spirit.3 The threat continues today: A "circle of poison"' causes "workers,
families, and communities" to be "slowly. . . poisoned by pesticides" in the
developing world.'
Pesticide regulation was "reformed" in the aftermath of Carson's book,
adding environmental considerations to the regulators' list of concerns and
shifting regulatory power from the United States Department of Agriculture
to the newly created Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").6 EPA's
1972 final cancellation ofDDT's United States registration was widely touted
as a great victory for the environment.7 Environmental Defense, one of the
major environmental pressure groups today, continues to tout its role in the
DDT ban on its web site as an example of how citizen action can make a
difference in policy.8
The new regime did produce major changes in regulatory behavior.
Since 1972, EPA and pesticide manufacturers spent millions of dollars and
years of effort to "re-register" most active ingredients under the new
environment-friendly federal rules, canceling the registrations of some widely
used chemicals and leading manufacturers to withdraw registrations on
others.9 New international agreements extend the benefits of this regime to
3 AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 3 (1992) ("I
particularly remember my mother's troubled response to Rachel Carson's classic book about
DDT and pesticide abuse, Silent Spring, first published in 1962 .... She emphasized to my
sister and me that this book was different-and important.").
4 DAVID WEIR & MARK SHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTICIDES AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY
WORLD (1981).
'James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing World. The Exportation of Unregistered and
Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 167,
167 (1994/1995).
6 See Andrew P. Morriss, Pesticides and Environmental Federalism: An Empirical and
Qualitative Analysis of§24(c) Registrations, in ENVIRONMENTALFEDERALISM 137-45 (Terry
L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (summarizing history of pesticide laws).
' See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 395, 420-21 (1995) ("Taking DDT completely out of the stream of commerce has
resulted in a tremendous improvement in environmental quality and species protection."
citation omnitted)).
Environmental Defense still prominently features its work on DDT on its web site. See
ENVTL. DEFENSE, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.environnental
defense.org/documents/2506_R2002.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2003).
9 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 480-87 (2d ed. 1994) (reviewing
cancellations and other impacts of changes in registration to include environmental
considerations); see also CHRISTOPHER J. BosSo, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE
OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 200 (1987); Morriss, supra note 6, at 144-45 (describing problems with
registration and re-registration programs).
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other countries, pushing bans on "persistent" pesticides elsewhere to comple-
ment the United States' actions.1°
This sounds like a successful example of a centralized command and
control regulatory regime. And yet, there are reasons to doubt that central
planning" 'produced success. Overall, pesticide use is growing in developing
'o See Erin Perkins, The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Step
Toward the Vision of Rachel Carson, 2001 COLO. J. INT'L. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 191, 191-92,
194-96, 197-99 (describing negotiation of Persistant Organic Pollutants ("POPs") treaty).
"For a general discussion of central planning in the environmental context, see IAN WILLS,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A SIGNALLING AND INCENTIVES APPROACH 103-120
(1997). Farm programs generally fit this definition and environmental regulations have
increased the central planning component. This can be seen in the increasingly mandatory
nature of agricultural regulation. "During the past thirty years, federal regulation of the
resources used in agriculture has shifted from giving technical and educational support to
farmers to make voluntary decisions on conservation practices to imposing criminal penalties
on farmers for carrying out what had been routine farm practices." John K. Hosemann,
Agriculture and the Environment: A Thirty-Year Retrospective, in AGRICULTURAL POLICY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 174 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 2003).
Others might disagree with us that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA") is a central planning regime, something we plan to address in detail in future
work. Professor J. B. Ruhl, for example, a thoughtful critic of agriculture and the
environment, writes:
In short, so long as the label instructions are followed, the applicator is
properly certified and the applicator follows worker safety and
recordkeeping requirements, FIFRA imposes no direct restrictions or
requirements on farms. While this does not amount to a complete safe
harbor for farm use of pesticides, FIFRA's hands-off approach to
farms-the primary users of pesticides-pales in comparison with the
CAA's and the CWA's regulatory approach to their targeted industries.
Under FIFRA, with regard to farmers, no permits are required, no
environmental or efficiency performance standards are imposed, no
technology-based standards are applied, no regular public reporting of
pesticide applications is required, and no monitoring of pesticide levels in
soils, runoff, or groundwater is required. Although some states regulate
pesticide applications more aggressively than does FIFRA, it is fair to say
that the nation has no comprehensive regulatory framework governing
farm use of pesticides.
J.B. Ruhl, The Environmental Law of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill Out of a
Mountain, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203, 10,215 (2001). Despite this
laxity, we contend that FIFRA is central planning because it rests upon a regulator
determining the products that may be applied to particular crops and the conditions under
which those products may be used. EPA does not, however, tell manufacturers how much of
each product to produce or dictate to farmers when they must apply particular products. That
EPA has not adopted a planning regime that includes such details does not make what it does
any less of a centrally planned regime. The debate between "market socialists" and market
economists in the 1930s and 1940s over proposals to substitute planned economies that relied
on markets for some aspects of decision making to solve technical planning problems
established this. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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countries. 12 United States' pesticide use changed in content, but remains
substantial in volume.' 3 Critics of pesticide policy, including many of the
speakers at this symposium, are concerned that pesticide problems are
worsening. 4 Surprisingly, thirty years after the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") reforms and the victory over DDT, the critics
are not yet prepared to declare victory. Even worse from the perspective of
environmental pressure groups is the change in attitude toward DDT, a
substance whose name invokes extraordinary invective, 5 where the current
picture is not quite what the advocacy groups predicted. The New York Times
recently joined public health advocates in favoring the continued use of
DDT to combat malaria in developing countries.' 6 As a result, environmental
pressure groups have been forced to retreat from their goal of a global ban on
DDT.17
Is command and control regulation of pesticides a success story? We
contend that it is not. Instead we argue that the regulatory structure created
by FIFRA is inferior to the outcomes obtainable under a market approach to
pesticides. To make our argument, we first outline current pesticide use and
reasons farmers continue to use them in Part I. We then describe the
principles that inform a market approach to environmental problems in Part
II, followed by a discussion on how decisions about pesticide use are made,
something that the current regulatory structure largely ignores. Next, in Part
12 See, e.g., World Resources Institute Report 1998-1999.
'3 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 11, at 282-83 (discussing increase in use and citing primary
sources).
14 See, e.g., Pep Fuller & Thomas 0. McGarity, The Bush Administration's Cautious
Approach to Listing New Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Future of the POPs
Convention, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (2003); Kristina Thayer & Jane
Houlihan, Pesticides, Human Health and the Food Quality Protection Act, 28 WM. & MARY
ENTL. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming Winter 2004) (2004); see also JOHN WARGO, OUR
CHILDREN'S ToxIc LEGACY: How SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES
(2d ed. 1996). It is not at all clear that the litany of harms is correct. See LOMBORG, supra
note 1, at 226-48 (discussing evidence on pesticides and concluding that stopping pesticide
use would save twenty lives per year at a cost of $20 billion per year and 26,000 increased
deaths from cancers). For a critique of environmental groups' anti-pesticide campaigns, see
JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENvIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN
AMERICA 38-40 (1995).
" See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, She Runs with Wolves, 21 VT. L. REv. 743, 747 (1997) ("DDT
was not just a pest killer, it was an eagle killer, an osprey killer, a peregrine falcon killer, an
indiscriminate killer.").Fighting Malaria with DDT, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A24.
1 See Don Mayer, The Precautionary Principle and International Efforts to Ban DDT, 9
S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 135, 175-78 (2002) (describing negotiations over DDT provisions in POPs
treaty).
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III, we briefly outline four examples that illustrate the problems with
centralized regulatory solutions and the superiority of decentralized ap-
proaches to environmental problems. We conclude in Part IV by offering
some policy principles for pesticides.
The reader should note that this Article is not a comprehensive state-
ment of the case against central planning in pesticides, something that space
considerations prevent here and which we hope to provide in the future.
Rather, because of the power of the pesticide "fables" that currently dominate
the current debate,"8 our goal is simply to suggest that there are alternatives
to FIFRA and other one-size-fits-all rules, such as the ban on DDT produc-
tion, that need to be considered.
I. PESTICIDE USE
People use a lot of pesticides each year, and a significant proportion of
pesticides applied are used in the United States. In the United States alone,
estimates are that more than seven hundred million pounds of pesticides are
used by farmers each year, at a cost of over $4 billion.'9 It appears technically
"S We echo Jonathan Adler's application of the word "fable" to environmental history. See
Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 146 (2003). Adler, writing the first comprehensive
account of the famed 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga River, described the fire as a "fable"
because the term connotes,
a fictitious narrative that nonetheless conveys an important truth. See, e.g.,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 415 (10th ed. 1998)
(defining a fable as "a fictitious narrative or statement: as," among other
things, "a narration intended to enforce a useful truth."). The fables of the
Cuyahoga are narratives of the river's plight which purportedly explain the
evolution of federal water pollution controls.
Id. at 93 n. 14. Adler concludes that:
[w]hile it is relatively easy to identify the failings of existing fables, it is
difficult to construct an alternative narrative that does not present
problems of its own. History, unlike a fable, is nuanced and complex....
There are many threads which may be woven together to generate many
different fables. Some will be more consistent with the data than others.
None will be a perfect fit.
Id. at 146. Our alternative fables, set forth below, lack the nuance and complexity of the
complete story of each of these episodes. Our point is not to write the definitive history of
each of these-something the space limitations of a single symposium article would not
permit-but to illustrate some of the several important truths that the dominant versions of
these fables do not include.
19 David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Effects ofReducing Pesticide Use in
Agriculture, 46 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEM & ENV'T 273, 273 (1993). But see John R. Finney,
Optimizing the Use of Pesticides, 42 PESTICIDE Sci. 69, 69 (1994) ("there is general
2003]
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feasible to significantly reduce the amount of pesticides used.2° Why then are
so many pesticides used? 21 We find that this is a puzzle for the command and
control proponents in the pesticide literature, because it requires them to
reconcile farmers and ranchers' behavior, the deliberate introduction into
the environment of pesticides, which is, to them, a bad thing, with their
Jeffersonian view of small farmers as morally privileged.22 Central planning
advocates often resolve the puzzle by postulating that farmers and ranchers
who use pesticides do so because they are tricked by chemical companies,
ignorant of the consequences of pesticide use, or, in the case of "corporate"
farmers,23 are deliberately sacrificing the general welfare for corporate prof-
its.1
4
Pesticides are an input into agriculture and are used because they pro-
duce a sufficient increase in crop yield, including crop quality, to at least
cover the cost to the decision maker of using them. In short, farmers use
pesticides because they make more money when they use them than when
agreement that, in the absence of pesticides, global crop yields would be at least 30% lower
overall").
20 Pinentel et al., supra note 19, at 273 ("Several studies suggest that it is technologically
feasible to reduce pesticide use in the US by 35-50% without reducing crop yields.").
2 By far the most important use of pesticides in the United States is in agriculture, using
approximately eighty percent of pesticides used in the United States. David Pimentel et. al.,
Environmental and Social Costs of Pesticides: A Preliminary Assessment, in 1 CRC
HANDBOOKOF PEST MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE 721 (David Pimentel ed., 2d ed. 1990).
There are other important uses, such as pest control in homes, but we will focus on
ap!'cultural use since it is the target of much of the criticism.
See Peter J. Hill, What's So Special About the Farm?, in AGRICULTURALPOLICY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 1, 12-13 (discussing role of family farm ideology in
ariEcultural policy making).
Environmental pressure groups have trouble with family farmers' use of pesticides in
particular, because they glorify small scale agriculture, much as the anti-tobacco movement
has trouble with determining how to treat tobacco farmers. For one of the few environmental
writers to write critically of small farms, see Deborah L. Donahue, Justice for the Earth in
the Twenty-First Century, 1 WY. L. REV. 373 (2001). For a more nuanced, but still critical
view of farms and the environment, see Ruhl, supra note 11, at 10,203 ("The plain truth is
that farms pollute groundwater, surface water, air, and soils; they destroy open space and
wildlife habitat; they erode soils and contribute to sedimentation of lakes and rivers; they
deplete water resources; and they often simply smell bad.").
24 See, e.g., GORE, supra note 3, at 184 (recounting "short term" perspective that leads to
heavy pesticide use).
People who lease the land for short-term profits often don't consider the
future. From fence row to fence row, they strip-mine the topsoil and move
on. And even if you own the land, it's hard to compete in the short term
against somebody who doesn't care about the long term.
Id. at 3.
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they do not.25 Their willingness to spend substantial amounts, such as $8.5
billion in 1996, is convincing evidence that farmers find pesticide use profit-
able.26 Any pesticide policy that hopes to have an impact on pesticide use will
have to take this fact into consideration rather than relying on assumptions of
farmer ignorance or disregard for the environment. Unfortunately, most of
modem pesticide policy does not do so. 27 We will return to that point shortly,
but let us consider the use decision in more detail first.
At the risk of grossly oversimplifying the decision making process, let
us consider the alternatives a farmer faces in growing her crops. First, our
farmer must decide what to grow, as a great deal of agricultural land will
support more than one type of crop. As "[s]election of a particular crop to
grow is likely the single most important pest management decision a grower
will make, 28 this has a significant impact on pesticide use. For example, crop
land in northern Ohio where one of us lives can be used to grow both
soybeans and corn (and other things too). Land can also be left fallow, to
"rest" it and improve its productivity, because crop prices do not support its
use, because weather prevents timely planting, due to payments to take it out
of production for conservation purposes, or many other reasons. Second,
when should the farmer plant? Delaying planting can reduce the need to use
herbicides, for example, but also reduces yields. 29 Third, having decided what
to grow, our farmer must decide how intensively she will farm her land.
Should she plant "hedgerow to hedgerow" or leave buffer strips that protect
25 Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 274 ("Dollar returns for the direct benefits to farmers have
been estimated to range from $3 to $5 for every $1 invested in the use of pesticides . ").
Farmers also use pesticides as a form of insurance, to reduce risk. See J. Palti, Farmers'
Perceptions of Pest and Disease Control, in ADVISORY WORK IN CROP PEST AND DISEASE
MANAGEMENT 20 (J. Palti & R. Ausher eds., 1986); Craig D. Osteen, The Policy and Eco-
nomic Issues of Pest Control and Energy Use, in ENERGY IN PLANT NUTRITION AND PEST
CONTROL 271-72 (Zane R. Helsel ed., 1987) (discussing impact of risk aversion on pesticide
use).
26 JORGEFERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & SHARON JANS, DEP'T OF AGRIC., PEST MANAGEMENT IN
U.S. AGRICULTURE 1 (Agric. Handbook No. 717, 1999).
27 See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 392 (1993) ("it is
important to underscore what pesticide regulation is not: it is not a body of law that addresses
in any strategic way the underlying prevalence of pesticides in American agriculture, nor is
it a body of law designed to minimize pesticide use"). We disagree with much of Prof.
Hornstein's analysis, but agree with his assessment of the lack of a systematic approach in
Pesticide law.
8 M. Barrett & W.W. Witt, Alternative Pest Management Practices, in ENERGY IN PLANT
NUTRITION AND PEST CONTROL, supra note 25, at 197, 197.
29 Id. at 204.
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streams and neighboring land from "drift" of any chemicals she might apply
to the land? Should she use fertilizers to increase productivity? Should she
spray herbicides to control weeds, use bioengineered crop strains to allow
enhanced herbicide use, substitute labor for chemicals and have weeds re-
moved by hand, change tilling practices to affect weed growth, or some
combination of the above? Should she spray for insects whenever she sees a
destructive species in the field or use a sophisticated computer model to
predict when the economic threshold has been reached that justifies
spraying?3" If she sprays, should the pesticide be applied by hand? By plane?
By tractor? What should she spray? Or should she drop chemical use al-
together and become an organic farmer? Even if we pretend that these
decisions need be made only once per season, when many of them must be
made almost daily, it is easy to see that pesticide use is merely a small part
of a complex set of business decisions that farmers must make.
Pesticides are an expensive input3 and farming is a low margin busi-
ness.32 It seems unlikely, therefore, that farmers would routinely make un-
informed and incorrect decisions about pesticide use that cost them money.
Certainly farmers that did routinely make bad decisions about pesticides
would be throwing away money, either by needlessly applying an expensive
input to their land or by allowing weeds or insects to unnecessarily and
unprofitably reduce their crop yields. Those farmers would be at a com-
petitive disadvantage compared to farmers who made smarter decisions about
pesticides and, in time, would be driven out of business. The market should
work and optimal pesticide decisions should result.
This picture is not quite right, however. There are three major problems
with the simple market story. First, the economic calculations of farmers
are subject to massive distortion from government agricultural programs.
Second, pesticides have impacts beyond the fields in which they are applied,
what economists usually call "externalities." These impacts may mean that
farmers' decisions, based on the costs and benefits of pesticides to farmers
and optimal from each individual farmer's perspective, are not socially opti-
30 See C.H. Blazquez et al., Remote Sensing by Aerial Infrared Colour Photography as an
Aid in Monitoring Crops for Pests and Diseases, in ADVISORY WORK IN CROP PEST AND
DISEASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 25, at 103, 103-06 (describing several such systems).3t See, e.g., H. Frankel, Pesticide Application: Technique and Efficiency, in ADVISORY WORK
IN CROP PEST AND DISEASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 25, at 132, 156 ("Pesticides must be
used at their lowest effective doses, because they are expensive .... ").32 See generally, Ruhl, supra note 11 (discussing farm economics in the context of environ-
mental issues).
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mal as social costs and benefits may diverge from private costs and benefits. 3
Third, pesticides serve an important function for farmers beyond killing pests;
using pesticides serves as a form of insurance for farmers.34
Nonetheless, there is a powerful incentive not to throw money away on
inputs that do not add value. The technological feasibility of reducing pesti-
cide use is not the only issue; the economic feasibility is also important. For
example, even Dr. Pimentel and his colleagues, who argue pesticide use
could be substantially cut, concede that doing so would require additional
expenditures of$1 billion.35 In particular, pesticides are a substitute for labor
in many instances.36 Spraying an herbicide on a cotton field is a substitute for
using manual labor to remove weeds.37 There are social and environmental
impacts of the substitution in addition to the possible social costs of using the
herbicide that need consideration in any attempt at a cost-benefit analysis.
Farm labor, for example, is dangerous, unpleasant work often performed by
children." Limiting the availability of herbicides for cotton will most likely
lead to increased child labor, increased injuries to children working in the
fields, 39 and decreased availability of education for farm worker children" as
farmers substitute labor for chemical weed control. Hand weeding also has
" See, e.g., Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 274 (noting indirect costs).
14 See J.D. Mumford, A Study of Sugar Beet Growers' Pest Control Decisions, 97 ANNALS
APPLIED BIOLOGY 243, 248 (1981) ("Insurance was the principle reason for using insecticides
for 44 of the farmers interviewed [of 60]."); see also Hornstein, supra note 27, at 397-98
(describing insurance theory of pesticide use).
5 Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 283.36 Maurice B. Green, Energy in Pesticide Manufacture, Distribution and Use, in ENERGY IN
PLANT NUTRITION AND PEST CONTROL, supra note 25, at 165, 176-77 (noting that pesticides
substitute capital and energy for labor); Osteen, supra note 25, at 267 ("Pesticides have
displaced more labor-intensive methods of pest control such as cultivation."); K.M. Jones et
al., Spray Application Technology, 31 PLANT GROWTH REG. 173, 174 (2000) (noting that
labor costs led to adoption of hydraulic, air-blast equipment in place of hand lances because
the former were "faster and less labour intensive"); see also, Pimentel et al., supra note 19,
at 281 ("It would be possible to reduce herbicide use on corn by up to 60% if the use of
mechanical cultivation and rotations were increased.").37 G.A. MATrHEWS, PESTICIDE APPLICATION METHODS 4 (3d ed. 2000) ("Herbicide use has
increased most where labour costs are high, there is a peak labour demand, or where
mechanical hoeing will cause damage to the young crop.").
3 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FINGERS TO THE BONE: UNITED STATES FAILURE TO PROTECT
CHILD FARMWORKERS (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/frmwrkr/.
" Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 851, 871-72 (1996).
40 See Teresa Young Reeves, Harvest of Danger: The Child Farmworker in the United
States, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 12, 14 (2001) ("According to a 1991 study by the U.S.
Department of Education, the impact of the farmworker lifestyle on education showed 80
percent of adult migrant farmworkers function at a fifth grade literacy level or less.").
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environmental costs as it causes "general disturbance of [the] soil" that "can
increase erosion of some soils."' Deciding whether the social costs outweigh
the social benefits of pesticide use is thus not an easy task-and much more
difficult than much of the central planning pesticide literature suggests.
Modem pesticide policy is built around fixing the so-called externality
problems through a centralized, command and control regulatory regime.42
Pesticides may only be used if EPA, the central regulator, determines that
they may.4 3 In evaluating pesticides, EPA considers the crop losses that will
result if a particular pesticide is not available, the environmental impact of
the pesticide's use, and the human health effects." It then grants permission
for specific uses,45 requires specific language explaining the proper methods
of use on the pesticide's label,46 and prohibits the use of the pesticide for
anything other than the approved uses.47 At least in theory, EPA balances the
benefits and costs, allowing only pesticides that produce a net benefit.4"
Reasonable people, and unreasonable people too, might disagree over par-
ticular cost-benefit calculations or interpretations of toxicity data, but the data
should confine those disagreements to a relatively narrow band.49 They often
do not because of the deep value differences between agricultural interests
and environmental pressure groups over issues such as how to factor in
uncertainty.50
Unfortunately, this approach neglects the economic calculations made
by farmers about pesticide use. Simply announcing a rule and the penalties
for disobeying it are insufficient to change behavior in many instances."
41 MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 4.
42 See David Haddock, When Are Environmental Amenities Policy Relevant? (2003)
fWorking Paper, Northwestern University School of Law, on file with authors).
3 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (2000) ("registration pesticides"); 7 U.S.C. § 136(p) (2000) (includ-
ing emergency registration provisions); 7 U.S.C. § 136(v) (2000) (including special local
needs registrations).
44 See Osteen, supra note 25, at 277-79 (discussing alternative pesticide availability as a
factor in EPA's decision making).
41 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (2000).
46 RODGERS, supra note 9, at 470-79 (discussing labeling requirements).
47 There are a host of other regulations as well, requiring those using particular pesticides to
be licensed to do so, allowing minor variations on uses to deal with emergencies or special
local needs but the basic structure of the program is as described.
48 RODGERS, supra note 9, at 449-55 (discussing registration process).
41 We recognize that some farmers make rational economic calculations to avoid pesticide
use. See J. BISHOP GREWELL & CLAY J. LANDRY, ECOLOGICAL AGRARIAN: AGRICULTURE'S
FIRST EVoLUTION IN 10,000 YEARS 17-18 (2003).
50 See generally BOSSO, supra note 9.
" Anyone who doubts this should simply reflect on the continued existence of various crimes
[Vol. 28:35
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Rather, pesticide policy needs to recognize that farmers use pesticides pri-
marily because they make more money when they do so than when they do
not. 2 Farmers may be mistaken about particular facts that influence their
decisions, but they are unlikely to be either systematically fooled by chemical
companies or so ignorant as to make systematic errors in favor of excessive
pesticide use.13
Where there are information problems that lead to over-use, correcting
the underlying information problem is almost always more effective and less
expensive than other means of solving the problem 54-if only because
identifying the problem presumes that the regulator has already obtained the
information the farmer needs. Even the much lamented shift to "corporate"
farming" cuts in favor of such solutions over command and control solutions.
despite laws forbidding them, including crimes dangerous to the participants. See Randy
Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness ofPublic Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593
(1994) (reviewing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR:
RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993)).
52 See, e.g., Barrett & Witt, supra note 28, at 226 ("To the farmer, the most important
analysis is the return on the investment in weed control costs.").
" We do not contend that farmers never make mistakes. There is ample evidence that they
do. See, e.g., M. Barrett & W.W. Witt, Maximizing Pesticide Use Efficiency, in ENERGY IN
PLANT NUTRITION AND PEST CONTROL, supra note 25, at 235, 245 (noting that calibrations
are frequently incorrect on farmers' equipment). What we are arguing is that such errors are
rarely systematically in the direction of unnecessary use of an expensive product. Thus, for
example, the calibration errors noted above have thirty-two percent of farmers applying ten
percent or more below the intended rate and thirty percent of farmers applying ten percent
or more above the intended rate, a rough equivalence. Id. Moreover, the fact that more
precise calibration is possible does not mean it is economically feasible. Calibrating
equipment has a cost and will only be done to the extent it repays the cost of doing so.
Farmers who overspray and could have a net increase in profits if they calibrated their
equipment more precisely will suffer economically compared to those who do calibrate their
equipment more precisely. See, e.g., B.S. Butler & L.E. Dode, Effects of Application
Methods in Energy Use, in ENERGY IN PLANT NUTRITION AND PEST CONTROL, supra note 25,
at 235, 263-65. Farmers who overspend on calibration, however, will also suffer
economically compared to those who do not. Id.
Prof. Hornstein hypothesizes that farmers may use excessive pesticides due to the
existences ofprisoner's dilemmas, tragedies of the commons, or externalities. See Hornstein,
supra note 27, at 396. In the absence of data demonstrating that these effects are present, we
argue that they are an inadequate basis for policy.
" See, e.g., Mumford, supra note 34, at 250 (noting English sugarbeet growers accurately
assess risk of loss from a virus but overestimate efficacy of pesticide treatments).
"5 See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 23, at 376 ("Our devotion to the family farm and ranch,
which dates to Thomas Jefferson's time, continues to provide the gloss on, if not the impetus
for, most of our national and state agricultural policies."). But see Hosemann, supra note 11,
at 173-74, 185 (arguing increasing scale of farming improves environmental quality while
giving an example of lessened impact of planting and harvesting due to increased scale of
operations).
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Corporations, as their critics constantly point out,56 are about making money
and throwing away money on unnecessary inputs is not something that
markets reward.17
Modem pesticide policy says almost nothing about the first problem,
however. Almost every aspect of a farmer's decision making is distorted by
government-led agricultural programs.58 Which crop to plant, how intensive-
ly to farm, whether to let fields lie fallow in some years, and whether to
maximize output are all questions that a rational farmer cannot make without
considering agricultural programs.
The net effect of these programs is an increase in pesticide use. For
example, the cotton price support program increases pesticide use by ten
percent according to one estimate.59 Soybeans are heavily subsidized,6"
leading more farmers to plant them than would otherwise 6' and are also a
crop with extensive pesticide use.62 Corn production is increased by the sugar
program, which raises the price of sweeteners, thereby raising corn produc-
tion to produce more com sweeteners.63 The ethanol program also increases
56 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The A morality ofProfit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 45, 46 (2002).
7 The "six sigma" approach to quality control is a good example of the rewards of close
attention to costs through reducing defects. See, e.g., George Eckes, Making Six Sigma Last
(and Work), IVEY Bus. J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 77, 77 (describing how six sigma quality control
process "has helped save billions of dollars while improving customer satisfaction ratings and
stock prices as well"). For a general description of how companies focus on quality control
to save money, see Michael Arndt, Quality Isn't Justfor Widgets, BUS. WK., Jul. 22, 2002,
at 72.
" See Bosso, supra note 9, at 63-64 ("Federal agricultural policy, whether Democratic or
Republican in origin, in many ways unwittingly promoted heavier pesticides use.").
'9 Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 280.
o The 2002 farm bill, for example, offered a support price of $5.00/bushel for soybeans,
whose market price had been $4.10-4.40/bushel the year before. By comparison, the support
price for corn was only $1.98/bushel compared to market prices the preceding year of $1.85-
1.95. The support price for wheat was set at $2.80/bushel compared to prior year market
prices of $2.75-2.85/bushel. See David Rogers, House Passes Massive Farm Bill, WALL ST.
J., May 3, 2002, at A12. Soybeans' subsidy of thirteen to twenty-two percent over market,
compared to corn's subsidy of two to three percent above market and wheat's subsidy of
1.7% to -1.5%. See id.
6 See, e.g., Peter Harriman, Conversions to Farmland Threaten S.D. Environment, ARGUS
LEADER, Apr. 8, 2003, at A4 (describing how federal agricultural programs for soybeans are
harming wildlife habitat in South Dakota), available at 2003 WL 6770627.
62 Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 281.
63 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, The Politics of Sugar: The 1990 Farm Bill, at http://
www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cashingin sugar/sugar05.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003) (noting
that corn producers receive $548 million per year in benefits from the sugar subsidy
program's increase in sugar prices' influence on corn sweetener sales).
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corn production.' As corn is one of the most chemical intensive crops, these
subsidies also boost pesticide use.65 Indeed, the four crops accounting for
the vast majority of American pesticide use-corn, cotton, soybeans, and
wheat 66-are all heavily subsidized. The structure of many farm programs
also encourages intensive use of limited land rather than less-intensive use of
more land,67 thus promoting use of inputs that raise yield, such as pesticides
and fertilizers, and discouraging practices that minimize the impacts of those
inputs, such as leaving buffer strips68 between fields and streams. "Each
farmer's rational response [to acreage based programs] could be but one
thing-take the cash, and then maximize profits by producing as much as
possible on the unrestricted acreage. 69
Failing to recognize the importance of agricultural programs on farmers'
decisions to use and not use pesticides dooms those programs to failure. A
centralized regulatory scheme can work only when regulators have access to
and consider the relevant information set.70 Can it succeed at more limited
objectives? Pesticide registration can certainly keep some harmful products
from the market if it is built around appropriate data requirements and has
sufficient technical resources to evaluate the data it requires.
4 The ethanol program uses approximately seven percent of the United States' corn crop.
Gary D. Liebcap, Agricultural Programs with Dubious Environmental Benefits: The
Political Economy of Ethanol, in AGRICULTURALPOLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
11, at 89, 90. For critiques of the environmental consequences of the ethanol program and
discussion of the special interest politics underlying it, see id. (describing ethanol program
and its environmental impacts); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent
Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE
GREEN CURTAIN 1,9-13 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
6 Zane R. Helsel, Pesticide Use in World Agriculture, in ENERGY IN PLANT NUTRITION AND
PEST CONTROL, supra note 25, at 179, 189 (writing that corn is one of the top two crops for
herbicides and is the top crop for insecticides).
66 FERNANDEZ-CARNEJO & JANS, supra note 26, at 3 ("In 1995, four crops--corn, soybeans,
cotton, and wheat-accounted for more than 85 percent of the herbicides used, and two crops
loom and cotton) accounted for nearly 65% of the insecticides used.").
BOSSO, supra note 9, at 29 (noting that "[c]ontrols were placed on acreage, not production"
meant farmers increased intensity of farming on acres planted. (quoting HARRISON
WELLFORD, SOWING THEWIND 253 (1972))); Hosemann, supra note 11, at 173 ("On balance,
government-sponsored research, direct government subsidy payments to farmers, and
commodity price guarantees have resulted in high-tech, high-yield intensive agriculture.").
68 Graham A. Matthews & Neale Thomas, Working Towards More Efficient Application of
Pesticides, 56 PEST MGMT. SCI. 974,975 (2000) ("The aim of these buffer zones is to protect
sensitive ecological areas, especially water surfaces downwind of fields sprayed with
pesticide.").
BOSSO, supra note 9, at 29.
70 WILLS, supra note 11, at 103-20 (describing limits of central planning approach to
environmental problems).
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The question is not whether it is theoretically possible to identify harm-
ful chemicals in advance, however, but whether the net impact of screening
new products will be positive. Registration is expensive-a single new
product is estimated to cost $40 to $80 million to develop. 7' As a result,
companies introduce fewer new products than would be introduced in the
absence of registration. If most of the products avoided are worse than
existing products, this would not be a problem. If, on the other hand, newer
pesticides are better for the environment than older ones, slowing innovation
could be harmful as it delays the introduction of environmentally safer
products. There is some evidence that newer products are generally preferable
on environmental grounds to older products, 72 suggesting that the slowing
of innovation caused by the expense of registration is harmful to the environ-
ment.
To briefly summarize, pesticide use is a complex decision made by
individuals in response to a variety of factors.73 Among the most important
of these factors is the impact of agricultural programs that change farmers'
decisions about how to conduct their businesses. To successfully influence
pesticide use, regulatory programs must take into account these factors, and
the current command and control structure does not do so effectively, and
cannot be expected to because of the special interests that dominate
agricultural and environmental policy.
fI. FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
An alternative to central planning is reliance on decentralized insti-
tutions, including the common law and markets. The market approach to
environmental issues is based on a few simple principles. These include:
" Roger Anthony Downer, The Impact of Spray Modifiers on Pesticide Dose Transfer 2
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Portsmouth); Green, supra note 36, at
176 ($74 million estimate).
71 See infra note 114.
7' Frankel, supra note 31, at 132.
Optimal application methods can be defined only when account is taken
of all factors influencing the dispersal of the pesticide over its target
surface, and its deposition and adherence to that surface. Also to be taken
into consideration are the characteristics of the pest, its mobility and site
on the host, as well as environmental conditions, such as temperature,
relative humidity and air movement.
Id.; see also Mumford, supra note 34, at 243 ("A farmer's pest control decision is determined
by his goals (which influence the decision rules by which he chooses control actions), the
range of protection measures of which he is aware and able to employ, and his perceptions
of the hazard posed by pests and the effectiveness of controls . . ").
[Vol. 28:35
MARKET PRINCIPLES FOR PESTICIDES
* Market incentives spur individuals to conserve resources and
protect environmental quality;
* Private property rights encourage stewardship of resources;
* Polluters should be liable for the harm they cause others; and
* Government subsidies often degrade the environment.
Let us consider briefly why each of these principles is important for
improving environmental quality.
Free market environmentalism falls on the Coasian side of the Coase-
Pigou divide.74 Coasian analysis emphasizes "contract and property-rights
enforcement and relies on market successes" while Pigovian analysis focuses
on market failures and government action to correct those failures.75 The
great advantage of the Coasian approach is that it need not solve the central
planner's problem of simultaneously preventing regulatory capture and gath-
ering sufficient information to be able to select the appropriate policy. By
emphasizing decentralized markets and neutral legal principles, Coasian
solutions sidestep these hard problems; problems that, as our next section
illustrates, are important obstacles to coherent pesticide policy. Pigovian
analysis, on the other hand, requires a great deal of knowledge to calculate
optional subsidies and taxes to induce people to conform to the calculated
social optimum behaviors.
A. Market Incentives
It is a common practice in environmental literature to blame markets for
environmental problems. For example, market critics often note that polluters
use the atmosphere or rivers as "free" disposal services, causing pollution.
Although such things occur, it is also important, but less common, to consider
whether markets play a role in protecting the environment as well.
Markets can help the environment in two crucial respects. First, when
resources are allocated by markets, resource owners are subject to the
discipline of the marketplace
because the wealth of the property owner is at stake if bad
decisions are made. Moreover, if private owners can sell their
74See Bruce Yandle, Public Choice and the Environment: From the Frying Pan to the Fire,
in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN, supra note 64, at
31, 34-35.
" See id. at 33-39 (elaborating on distinction between two approaches).
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rights to use resources, the owners must not only consider
their own values, they must also consider what others are
willing to pay. In the market setting, it is the potential for
gains from trade that encourages cooperation.76
Markets thus allow resource use to change based on changing conceptions of
value, force resource owners to consider the long-term value of their assets
and the impact of their actions upon that value, and offer individuals who
disagree with others' resource allocation decisions the opportunity to bid the
resources away from those with whom they disagree about appropriate use.77
Second, when markets are involved, transactions benefit from the
market's power to convey information in a concise, low-cost format.7"
Markets solve what Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek called the "information
problem."79 Making decisions about resources requires knowing a great deal
of information about alternative uses of those resources. For example, if
someone is trying to decide whether or not to buy a particular car, the buyer
must know what her alternatives are for transportation. Could she ride public
transit to her destinations instead? Which model car offers the best com-
bination of features (mileage, leg room, safety, amenities such as CD players
and leather seats) for her needs? Markets assist in making such evaluations
by reducing much of the information to easy-to-understand prices. The
prospective car buyer does not need to know about the alternative uses of the
resources that go into making a car stereo, she only needs to know the price
of that option to make a decision about whether her desire for a car stereo can
be met. A central planner, on the other hand, would have great difficulty
76 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 4 (rev. ed.
2001).
" Hill, supra note 22, at I ("In a market economy, competing claims are resolved through
bids and offers between owners and potential owners. Individuals who believe they have a
better use for a resource can gain control of that resource by offering to pay more than its
opportunity cost.").
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
'9 Id. at 519-20.
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances
of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The
economic problem of a society is ... a problem of the utilization of
knowledge [which is] not given to anyone in its totality.
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assembling information on all car buyers' level of interest in car stereos, the
alternative uses of those resources, the cost of production, and other factors.
Thus, markets offer a key advantage-they efficiently process information
and allow decentralized decision making.
The final advantage of markets is that when information changes,
through new discoveries or through changes in values, markets can quickly
convey those changes through price changes. Those price and value changes
in turn offer entrepreneurial opportunities to make a profit by exploiting the
changes. Thus, for example, if a particular product is discovered to be
environmentally harmful and at least some people value the environment, an
entrepreneur can make a profit by offering an alternative that is less harmful
than the old product."0
B. Private Property
Markets do not always work, however. Polluters do treat the air and
water as a disposal resource when they can do so at a lower cost than paying
to dispose ofwastes. The problem is not, however, that polluters are misusing
their property, but that they are misusing resources owned by others. This is
a particular problem when the resource is "unowned" or held in some form
of common property without well-defined use rights amongst the owners."1
For example, if no one "owns" a stream's water quality, a factory owner will
take that attribute of the stream by using it as a waste disposal source. It is the
'0 For a general discussion of the role of entrepreneurs in solving environmental problems,
see TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENvIRO-CAPrrALISTS: DOING GOOD WHILE
DOING WELL (1997) [hereinafter ANDERSON & LEAL, ENvIRO-CAPITALISTS]. Anderson and
Leal define "enviro-capitalists" as
entrepreneurs using business tools to preserve open space, develop
wildlife habitat, save endangered species, and generally improve
environmental quality. These entrepreneurs are meeting the growing
demand for recreational and environmental amenities. To do this, enviro-
capitalists must invent new products, attract venture capital, contract with
resource owners, and market their products.
Id. at3.
I See generally Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123
(2001) (examining different alternative solutions to tragedies of the commons and technology
specific problems).
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lack of property rights, however, not their existence, that is responsible for
the problem. Where water quality rights are private property, the owners can
take actions to protect their property rights and water quality is protected."
Unfortunately, in agriculture "property rights have been dramatically
attenuated .... 83
Such attenuation of rights has made it possible for politicians,
farmers, and environmentalists to ignore the full opportunity
costs of their actions. Instead of bidding for control of
resources through the marketplace, interested individuals and
groups must bid in the political arena. But resource control in
that arena is tenuous at best. Resource rents, including the
flow of income from commodity production and the amenity
rents desired by environmentalists, are continually up for
grabs. Under such a system competing claimants face an
incentive structure that encourages them to attempt to have
property rights redefined in their favor. And the threat of
redefinition that takes rights away from an existing holder
means politicians can engage in an ongoing process of selling
protection."
More generally, public "ownership" of resources such as the atmosphere and
the oceans can be considered an example of the tragedy of the commons. All
such tragedies
raise two questions: who has what rights and what are the
costs associated with defining and enforcing those rights?
Where rights are clearly defined and easily enforced, as in the
case of surface land, there is no tragedy, because entry is
limited by the owner's fence. If party A dumps his garbage on
party B's land, party B can enforce his right against trespass.
On the other hand, where rights are not well defined or easily
82 See Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers'
Conservation Association, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENvIRONMENT 86 (Roger E.
Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
83 Hill, supra note 22, at 1.
84 Id. at 13.
[Vol. 28:35
MARKET PRINCIPLES FOR PESTICIDES
enforced, as with the right to clean air, trespass is much more
difficult to prevent.8 5
The key to solving these problems is thus finding the least cost method of
ensuring that private property rights can be specified and are cheaply
enforceable. Well-specified and defensible private property rights are critical
to the functioning of markets. As creating and enforcing private property
rights in environmental goods enhances the ability of markets to protect the
environment, an important part of the market approach is facilitating the
creation and enforcement of private property rights.
C. Paying for Damages
Defending property rights requires that those who harm the property of
another pay damages for doing so. Courts can also enjoin future harmful
activity. Ordinary principles of tort, contract, and property law provide a
means for holding rights violators liable.86 Payment for harm caused is
critical because it provides an incentive for considering the impact of one's
conduct on others.
There are limits, however. Damages are owed for harms to actual rights,
not for emotional distress over injuries to the property of another. Harms
must also be proven, not merely speculative. These limits can cause problems
on the frontiers of science because causation is difficult to prove in some
cases. (Such problems also afflict central planning solutions, however, since
regulators must resolve at least some of the same causation problems to know
how to regulate.) Some impacts, such as chemical residues in Antarctic
wildlife, may be difficult to remedy directly through tort actions: the wildlife
is unowned, the link to any particular person's conduct is difficult to prove,
and the harm to the wildlife, as opposed to the mere presence of the residues,
may be hard to prove.
The existence ofuncompensated harms due to such complications is not
determinative of whether market solutions can function, however. The
question must always be a comparative institutional one, as the same factors
that cause problems for tort solutions may also cause problems for planned
" ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 76, at 13.
16 See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923,926-46 (1999) (discussing the common
law approach).
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solutions. Further, while some harms from a particular action may not be
compensable under current tort law, those harms may be linked to other
compensable harms. Thus, for example, if drift of a pesticide from one field
to another increases harm to birds who inhabit the boundary areas between
fields, the harm to the birds may be prevented by the requirement that the
pesticide user compensate the neighboring field owner for the harm to his
crops caused by the drift. 87 It may not, however, and it is important to
acknowledge that not all harms can be compensated, because causation
problems will exist. Uncompensated harms are themselves entrepreneurial
opportunities for plaintiffs' lawyers, and, overtime, entrepreneurs will reduce
the set of uncompensated damages.
D. Subsidies
Government action has important implications for individual actions
because many government programs create incentives, intentionally or un-
intentionally, for environmentally destructive behavior.88 Generally, gov-
ernment subsidies have been widely recognized as major obstacles to
environmental quality.89 Such programs succeed in the political arena because
they provide concentrated benefits while diffusing their costs over a wide
population.90
Subsidies and regulations allow "people to ignore the opportunity cost
o ftheir actions,"9' often leading to environmental degradation. Early predator
control programs, for example, created incentives to kill wolves through the
payment of bounties, justifying this as creation of a public good (removal of
predators). 9 In fact, these programs proved destructive to the environment by
disrupting the ecosystem in the Mountain West, leading to massive increases
in herds of animals that the predators previously controlled.93 The increased
:7 See infra Part III.D.
88 See generally GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. Leal and Roger E. Meiners
eds., 2002).
'9 See generally Matthew Brown, Banking on Disaster: The World Bank and Environmental
Destruction, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 88, at 145 (describing impact
of World Bank subsidies on environmental projects).




92 See HANK FISCHER, WOLF WARS 10-23 (1995) (describing eradication programs).
9' Id. at 26-28 (describing environmental impact of increased prey herds).
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herds overgrazed important environmental resources, such as Yellowstone
National Park, causing serious environmental damage.94
The problem with subsidies is that political decision making often fails
to take environmental values into account. As there is no mechanism to force
political decision makers to consider the costs of their actions, they often opt
for subsidizing activities without doing so. Thus, for example,
Government dams have contributed to the demise of salmon
and the loss of wild rivers, and logging on national forests has
reduced water quality because not all of the costs are borne
by the decision makers. The nature of government funding
generates another type of third-party effect by concentrating
the benefits on special interest groups while diffusing the
costs over a large segment of the population.95
The dams subsidize flood control for people down river, electricity for
favored customers, and recreation for those who prefer lakes to wild rivers.
Logging on federal land at below market prices subsidizes employment in
some communities and domestic wood products industries over foreign
industries at the expense of consumers. Thus, eliminating subsidies will
improve environmental quality by allowing environmentally correct decisions
instead of pushing well-financed, politically-favored decisions.
E. Summary
To summarize, markets can protect the environment when property
rights are well-defined and defensible. The incentive to do so is independent
of the preferences of individual resource owners because market prices reflect
the values of all those willing to pay for any use of the resource. Those who
value environmental attributes of resources thus have the opportunity to
outbid those who do not. Environmental values will not always prevail in
such bidding contests, but they will influence decision making through their
expression in the marketplace.
Resource owners whose property is damaged by the actions of others
have the incentive to seek damages from those who harm their property.
94Id.
91 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 76, at 20.
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Injunctive relief is also an important aspect of protecting property rights.
Damages awards and injunctions prevent people from taking actions that
harm the property of others.
Distortions that often harm the environment occur when resources are
controlled through the political process or where the government subsidizes
destructive activity. Political decision making does not have to take into
account the preferences of alternative users since it allocates resources based
on non-market factors. If investing resources in the political process can yield
private benefits, individuals will compete for control of politically determined
resources. Lowering the price of environmentally destructive activity through
subsidies will result in more of such activity than would exist in a free
market. Eliminating the subsidies can thus enhance environmental quality.
IMl. FOUR ALTERNATIVE PESTICIDES FABLES
Having set out the argument that pesticide use is an economic decision
and outlined the market approach to environmental problems, we now turn
to our four examples of pesticide policies and the lessons that can be drawn
from each for pesticide policy.
We offer these alternative fables not because they "prove" our approach
is better than FIFRA's central planning approach, but because they illustrate
the issues differently than the dominant DDT fable. The existing approach to
pesticides is so ingrained in the literature that we must begin with first
principles to describe an alternative. Doing so requires us to illustrate that the
issues we contend are important are real. The next step in the debate is to
examine data more systematically to determine how best to approach pes-
ticide problems. At this stage, however, we must first establish that there are
issues other than the alleged routine poisoning of children, farmworkers, and
birds.
A. Early Pesticides & Legislation
Pesticide use is a relatively recent innovation. Before the development
of the modern organic pesticides in the 1940s, 96 pesticide use was relatively
9 See Green, supra note 36, at 165 ("Pesticides in the modem sense date from the discovery
during World War II of the phenoxyacetic herbicides and the organochlorine and
organophosphorus insecticides.").
[Vol. 28:35
MARKET PRINCIPLES FOR PESTICIDES
limited. 97 There are two reasons for this. First, prior to the modem era, pest
problems were less severe. Second, some early pesticides were less effective
and others more acutely toxic than modem pesticides.
Pest problems were less severe in the past because specialized agri-
culture is rather new in human history. For thousands of years, our ancestors
eked out a miserable livelihood scratching the dirt and hunting animals (and
each other) to generate the food they needed to survive.9" There was little
trade or specialization. Since there was limited trade, early agricultural prac-
tices generally relied on relatively mixed crop patterns as each area had to
produce much of its own food.9 9 As a result, before specialized agriculture
appeared, pest problems were, aside from things like plagues of locusts of
Biblical proportions," reasonably local problems.'0 '
If, however, instead of having a few apple trees out back along with a
mixture of other crops, a farmer now owns an orchard with hundreds of trees
and her next door neighbors do as well, because they live in country best
suited for apple production, the community now has a quite different set of
pest problems than their ancestors experienced due to lack of diversity in the
crops they rely on for their livelihood.
The growth of large scale, mono-crop agriculture, 0 2 something accel-
erated by the vast network of farm subsidy and other regulatory programs,
made pest problems more severe.'0 3 Solving them revolutionized American
agriculture.' 4 In an area covered in apple trees, pests in one farmer's trees
91 Bosso, supra note 9, at 29 (describing disadvantages of early pesticides).9" See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATE OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 86
BOSSO, supra note 9, at 28 (describing pest control advantages of crop rotation).
ooSee Exodus 10:13-14, 19.
Y. Elkana et al., Crop Protection Advice. Its Place in the General Scheme of Farming and
of Farm Advice, in ADVISORY WORK IN CROP PEST AND DISEASE MANAGEMENT, supra note
25, at 7, 8 ("Crop protection is not an important factor in low-level, subsistence farming
where production proceeds in a more or less stable agro-ecosystern, and epidemic disease or
pest outbreaks are rare.").
02 See Bosso, supra note 9, at 23-24, 28-29 (describing the "revolution" in agriculture that
followed World War II and the impact on farm techniques that followed).
10' See MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 3 ("Modem farming practices have more intensive
production of relatively few crops over large areas . . . ."); George W. Irving, Jr.,
Agricultural Pest Control and the Environment, 168 SCIENCE 1419, 1419 (1970) ("American
agriculture has evolved a monoculture system.... [T]he large acreages of wheat, corn, or
citrus orchards provide inviting environments for pests and diseases of the crops. .. ");
Osteen, supra note 25, at 267 ("New production systems that increased reliance on
monoculture and plant cultivars susceptible to pest damage may have encouraged pesticide
use .... ."); Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 277.
104 See Bosso, supra note 9, at 26.
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could now eat their way through the entire apple crop--wiping out the means
of survival." 5 Worse, bugs in neighbors' trees would happily munch their
way into other farmers' orchards as well, not recognizing the property lines
between the orchards. The increasing scale of agriculture and specialization
in food production raised standards of living"0 6 and produced some
environmental improvements, such as reducing the amount of land in
cultivation. '07 Unfortunately it also made what had been local or small threats
from a pest invasion that attacked one piece of the food supply into major
problems for specialist producers.0 8
Entrepreneurs responded by selling solutions: pesticides. Although there
are anecdotes about pesticides being used in ancient Greece and the Roman
Empire,0 9 the major use of pesticides began in the mid-nineteenth century.
Some early pesticides were substances like "Paris Green" and "London
Purple," inorganic poisons that required high enough doses to cause acute
medical problems for people who ate food with the pesticides still on them. "'
105 Elkana et al., supra note 101, at 8 ("The higher the yield and income the farmer aims at,
the higher the risks he has to take in his practices, and the greater the need for crop protection
advice.").
'o See, e.g., Green, supra note 36, at 172 (noting that in the United States one agricultural
worker can produce enough food to feed himself and sixty additional people, using only two
hectares of land, while, on average, in developing countries one agricultural worker can
produce only enough food to feed himself and two other people using about eight hectares
of land); Indur M. Goklany, Agricultural Technology and the Precautionary Principle, in
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 107, 116 (describing
benefits of modem agricultural technology).
107 Had technology, and therefore crop yields, been frozen
at 1961 levels, then producing the same amount of crops as was actually
produced in 1998 would have required a more than doubling of
agricultural land area.... This estimate optimistically assumes that the
productivity of the added acreage would be the same as that of the original
land. . . . Imagine the devastation that would have occurred had
agricultural technology been frozen at 1961 levels, while mortality rates
continued to drop worldwide in response to advances in public health,
hygiene, and medicine, pushing up population. Massive deforestation, soil
erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and losses of biodiversity would have
occurred with the more than doubling of the amount of land diverted to
agriculture.
Goklany, supra note 106, at 110-11.
'08 See Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 279 (noting that there has been an increase in
insecticide use on corn due to elimination of crop rotation on forty percent of the American
com crop).
" Downer, supra note 71, at 1 ("Records of the use of olive oil extracts for blight control
by the Greek philosopher Democrates date from 470 B.C. Vine pests were controlled with
sulfur fumes by Cato in Italy in 200 B.C.").
... Green, supra note 36, at 165 ("Pesticides before [World War II] were either inorganic
compounds such as sulfur, lead arsenate or Bordeaux mixture, or were naturally occurring
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Others were "secret formulas" peddled by scam artists that did not do much
at all. "'
This situation meant there were three problems with pesticides that
became popular in the late 1800s and early 1900s. First, the pesticides that
worked were often capable of causing acute health problems, including death,
if people ingested them. These were "Hobbesian" pesticides: nasty, brutish,
and acutely toxic. This prompted concerns about residues on foods, a concern
largely addressed by improving processing to remove the usually visible
residues."'
Second, some of the pesticides did not work. As with similar problems
with the patent medicine industry, the solution was labeling to allow pesticide
users to know what was in their products and who had made the product." 3
Thus, labeling reduced the opportunities for scam artists.
Third, in the view of some farmers, people were not using enough
pesticides. In economic terms, some people were "free riding" on their
neighbors' purchase and effort to treat their crops. In particular, in the Pacific
Northwest, some apple farmers were not spraying, relying instead on their
neighbors to control the pest problem." 4 Those who were spraying sought
help from the government to force their neighbors to spray and some of the
early state pesticide laws did exactly that: every apple grower had to spray.
At that time, most of the problems we associate with pesticides today
were not being considered-egg shell thinning among bald eagles, trace
pesticide derivatives in tissue samples from remote areas, and long-term
health effects were not known and were not perceived as problems. The
problems that were recognized were also primarily local-it was a neighbor
organic compounds such as nicotine or pyrethrum."); see also Bosso, supra note 9, at 29
(discussing early pesticides and terming early pesticides "rather inefficient, comparably
expensive" and terming them "rather brute instruments").
il JOHN PERKINS, INSECTS, EXPERTS AND THE INSECTICIDE CRISIS: THE QUEST FOR NEW
PEST MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 3-4 (1982) ("The commercialization of the insecticide
industry was accompanied by substantial fraud including adulterating legitimate products and
making extravagant claims for absolutely worthless junk.").
112 BOSSO, supra note 9, at 47-53 (discussing early residue controversies).
13 Bosso, supra note 9, at 48 ("Farmers feared increasingly that their purchases might be
ineffectual or outright dangerous, while chemical makers worried about 'unbridled
competition' and less scrupulous competitors.").
114 This section draws on Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, Agricultural Commons
Problems and Responses: Sick Hogs at the Trough, in AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 19,29-31 (discussing free rider problem in agricultural pest
control).
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who likely caused the problem for a farmer, not someone in another state or
country.
So what? After all, we do not often use lead, arsenic, or mercury any-
more as active ingredients in pesticides and we know a great deal more about
long distance transport of pesticides and their impact on wildlife. So why care
about what happened in 1910 in Washington State to apple growers? There
are three lessons to be learned from this episode:
1. Pesticide Problems Always Have a Local Dimension-They Start
with an Individual Making a Decision to Use or Not Use a Pesticide
There may be other dimensions to the problem, but all pesticide prob-
lems start with an individual decision to use or not use a pesticide, except
when we collectively act to force the use of pesticides. When pesticide use
is the result of individual decisions, we need to understand the economic
reasons individuals make the decisions they do.
Pesticides serve an important need for farmers, but their useful attributes
are not necessarily their problematic attributes. A pesticide that kills only the
target pest, for example, is a superior product in some dimensions for both
the farmer and the manufacturer to a broad spectrum pesticide that also kills
useful insects or plants.' Yet broad spectrum pesticides were themselves a
response to a problem-only a small proportion of an insect population is
typically at a vulnerable stage of their life cycle, so persistent pesticides
allowed a single application to reach a larger percentage of the population." 
6
They also reduced farmers' exposure by reducing the number of applications
necessary. 17 Now that we know more, however, persistence is no longer seen
as a purely positive attribute of a product. Changed information sets mean
changed preferences.
Pesticide technology continues to evolve and the characteristics of
pesticides change over time. New application techniques made possible by
new technology reduce the amount of pesticides needed to control pests' 18
115 MATrHEWS, supra note 37, at 1 (noting replacement of older broad spectrum pesticides
with "newer more active or selective chemicals"); see Pimental et al., supra note 19, at 275
noting improvement in toxicity of pesticides).
16 Bosso, supra note 9, at 30 (noting advantages of persistence for farmers); MATTHEWS,
supra note 37, at 20-21.
11 BSSO, supra note 9, at 29.
18 See, e.g., Downer, supra note 71, at 4 (noting development of "patch spraying programs"
made possible through use of global positioning systems).
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and new pesticides often require lower application rates. "9 In short, newer is
often greener. As we design regulatory regimes for pesticides, we therefore
must be careful that we do not distort the market incentive that took us from
the Hobbesian world of Paris Green to the less acutely toxic, more effective
products available today.
2. The "Right" Answer to Environmental Problems Evolves over Time
with Changed Circumstances and New Knowledge
Our views of pesticide use as a social problem have come full
circle-people used to worry that pesticides did not kill enough bugs and that
not enough people used them. Now we worry that they kill too many things
and that too many people use them. This illustrates a larger point that views
of appropriate actions with respect to the environment change over time. For
example, we are spending private and public money to restore the wolf to
areas that in earlier years we spent private and public money to eradicate.
Similarly, raptors such as hawks were the target of eradication efforts in the
eastern United States in the twentieth century; 120 more recently we listened
to Rachel Carson's concern about the impact of pesticide residues on raptor
health.' 2' We now devote resources to protecting eagles and hawks.
We might say, and we can certainly hope, that we are smarter today than
our ancestors were, or at least that we know more about the environment, and
so are capable of making better decisions today. However, our great, great-
grandparents were neither stupid nor environmental barbarians. They made
choices that we may no longer agree with about matters we now call environ-
mental management, but given how scarce resources were for them, we
know their decisions were made with care. We should presume that future
generations may also make different choices than we make and will know
more than we do. Our grandchildren may look back with chagrin at some of
our choices, just as we do with respect to some of our grandparents' choices.
19 See Green, supra note 36, at 170 (noting that "[t]here is a definite trend towards higher
activity in the most recently discovered pesticides" and noting lower application rates ofnew
chemicals).
'
2 See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning,
14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 128-29 (2000) (discussing raptor eradication programs as an
example of changed environmental mores and success of private conservation).
.2 See CARSON, supra note 2, at 110-19.
2003)
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
We are not suggesting that future generations will brush their teeth with
DDT powder. The policy prescription that results from this is simply that we
should be cautious about adopting one-size-fits-all solutions premised on our
knowing what we think now to be the final word on a subject. This is not an
argument for what is commonly called the "precautionary principle" '122 but
rather an argument for allowing diversity in environmental practices, prem-
ised on the notion that out of the experience with a wide range of practices
will emerge new knowledge about the most appropriate practices for various
circumstances.
We must tolerate environmental practices we disagree with and tolerate
different individuals and different societies making their own choices about
the environment, in general, and about pesticides, in particular. By "tolerate"
we mean to distinguish between the kind of activity described at this
Symposium where the National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC")
sought to prevent federal foreign aid agencies from funding use of pesticides
banned in the United States in foreign aid programs'23 and the attempts to
coerce other countries into making tradeoffs of risk and benefit to suit us, for
example, by strong-arming them into banning particular pesticides in their
countries.'24 The former can be legitimate as American taxpayers ought not
22See generally INDUR GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001) (critiquing application of the precautionary
principle in environmental debate and arguing principle requires action rather than delay in
some circumstances); see also Cross, supra note 39, at 870-76, 886-93 (discussing
precautionary principle and pesticides).
"3 See, e.g., Thomas Lovejoy, Global, 17 AMICUS J., Jan. 1996, at 40 (describing NRDC's
role); Ward Sinclair, Grounding the Medfly Warriors.- Lawmakers Protest Use of Banned
Pesticide in Guatemala Project, WASH. POST, May 29, 1987, at A23.
14 See Roger Thurow, A Choice of Evils. As a Tropical Scourge Makes a Comeback, So,
Too, Does DDT, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2001, at Al, A6 ("[E]motions reached a boiling point"
over the issue, with some groups pushing for an all-out ban. "'It was getting to the stage of
'Look at these environmentalists, they don't care about black babies dying in Africa," says
one negotiator, who backed an all-out ban." (citation omitted)); Nityanand Jayaraman,
Greenpeace International, Greenpeace and Other Indian Voluntary Sector Perspectives on
the POPs Problem in Asia in the Context of Larger Issues, at http://www.chem.unep.ch/
pops/POPsInc/proceedings/bangkok/JAYA.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003) ("The inter-
national negotiations on POPs offers us a chance to rid the planet of DDT once and for all.").
Of course, we need not tolerate others causing us harm, which is important because there are
serious problems of long distance transport, wildlife accumulation and other impacts of
pesticides outside the area where they are used. See Pierre Mineau, Birds and Pesticides: Are
Pesticide Regulatory Decisions Consistent with the Protection Afforded Migratory Bird
Species under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act?, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming Winter 2004).
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to subsidize activities elsewhere that our political process rejects as against
our interests. The latter is illegitimate because it attempts to prevent other
societies from using their own resources to make their own tradeoffs
concerning these issues.
Most importantly, we must recognize that most of the time, pesticides'
impacts and measures to control them involve tradeoffs. For example, some
soil conservation practices increase the need for pesticide use."' Modified
spray techniques to reduce drift, such as using coarser droplets to reduce
drift, produce other problems including poor impaction and retention char-
acteristics of the droplets.126 Pesticide use saves fossil fuel and reduces the
amount of land needed to produce food. 12 Granular pesticides reduce drift2 '
but increase threats to birds. 29 Pesticides make fruits and vegetables cheaper,
improving health from increased consumption of fruits and vegetables. 30
Recognizing that products A and B each have some good and some bad
attributes, for example, means that trading off A for B is rarely a simple
decision that will be appropriately made the same way in every circum-
stance.13 1 Yet the central planning approach to pesticides does exactly that.
.25 See Pimentel et al., supra note 19, at 278.
126 Downer, supra note 71, at 6, 8 (noting "conflict of interest between goals of maximizing
efficacy vs that of minimizing environmental contamination"); see also MATTHEWS, supra
note 37, at 17 (noting tradeoffs); Matthews & Thomas, supra note 68, at 975 (noting that
coarser spray used to minimize off-target drift reduces efficacy of application within the
field).
"'
2 7 See MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 1 ("Without modem technology (including the use of
pesticides) tripling world crop yields between 1960 and 1992, an additional twenty-five to
thirty million square kilometres of land would have had to be cultivated with low-yield crops
to feed the increased human population.... ."); Green, supra note 36, at 174 ("[The] use of
pesticide may result in considerable overall savings in fossil fuel energy as well as of land.").
Green provides several examples. Assuming a ten percent yield reduction of pesticides were
not used on corn, for example, he calculates that pesticides save 570 million gallons of oil.
Similarly, no till cultivation, which requires increased herbicide use, can save eight gallons
of oil per hectare. Id. at 175.
128 B.J. Butler & L.E. Bode, Effects of Application Methods on Energy Use, in ENERGY IN
PLANT NUTRITION AND PEST CONTROL, supra note 25, at 259, 261; Finney, supra note 19,
at 69.
29 See Mineau, supra note 124.
130 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 10 ("[S]crapping pesticides would actually result in more cases
of cancer because fruits and vegetables help to prevent cancer, and without pesticides fruits
and vegetables would get more expensive, so that people would eat less of them.").
13 The same is true of organic produce and what we might call "chemically enhanced"
produce. The latter is superior to the former on several dimensions, including but not limited
to cosmetic standards. For example, it is good to have fewer worms in apples, because that
leads to fewer worms in applesauce, lower processing costs (avoiding the labor needed to
remove the worms), and so lower prices for applesauce. Organic foods serve an important
market segment, albeit one that is expanding from a small base. That does not mean,
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3. Be Wary of Public Good Arguments
The Washington State apple growers who successfully sought to force
their neighbors to spray toxic chemicals on their trees were not chemical
crazy. Their arguments were essentially the same as the arguments used to
justify a wide range of environmental programs today. They did not make the
case in exactly these terms, but the essence of the argument was there. The
control of pests benefits not only landowners who control pests on their land
but also benefits their neighbors, who suffer fewer losses from pests as a
result. It benefits all citizens, because it ensures a good steady crop of apples
for everyone.
In economics jargon, the private benefit of spraying one's apple trees is
less than the social benefit, but the cost of spraying is borne entirely by the
farmer who does the spraying. Indeed, these arguments continue to be made
about pesticide use."' As a result, the rational apple farmer did not spray
"enough"-since he could not capture the full benefit of his actions. This
argument appears regularly in the environmental economics literature. For
example, it is often claimed that private landowners will not preserve enough
habitat because they do not capture the full benefit of the increased wildlife
diversity the habitat makes possible.133 Change the words and it is the same
argument for almost any program. In short, private benefits and private costs
are almost never the same as social benefits and social costs, however those
however, that mandating organic production techniques is justified on environmental
gounds.
2 See, e.g., Osteen, supra note 25, at 269-71 ("With a mobile pest, a farmer might
underestimate the damage per pestbecause some ofthe damage occurs elsewhere. In essence,
the mobile pest is a negative common property resource which causes social and private
optimums to diverge .... ."); J. Palti & R. Ausher, The Place of Pest and Disease
Management in the Agricultural Economy, and Its Legal Framework, in ADVISORY WORK
IN CROP PEST AND DISEASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 25, at 3, 4 ("The principle reasons
why pest and disease control in crops is so often a matter of public interest [include] ....
[p]est and diseases appearing in one farmer's field may well endanger the crops of his
neighbors.").
' See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act
Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 249
(1998) ("Habitat loss is a classic externality." (citation omitted)); see also Donald J.
Boudieaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999)
(arguing that contingent valuation, an attempt to place values on common environmental
assets, is flawed and should be rejected as a policy making guide to protect environmental
law). But see ANDERSON & LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPrrALISTS, supra note 80, at 4-8 (describing in
detail how International Paper made significant profits by managing its timber lands for
habitat and selling access to recreational users).
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might be defined. As a result, we can generate a theoretical public good
argument to justify almost any state action. 134
Our point here is that we should be wary of such justifications and
demand thorough exploration of the factual basis of public good arguments
whenever we encounter them, because such arguments appear to justify
mutually contradictory, but always coercive, actions dependent on what are
often rather flimsy factual assumptions and assertions.
B. Subsidizing Spraying35
The discovery of modem organic pesticides during World War II created
a new set of cheap and effective tools. As these first modem pesticides were
both broad spectrum pesticides and significantly safer to users than their
"Hobbesian" predecessors, they were soon used on a wide range of insect and
weed pests. As a result,"[pesticide] [u]sage increased fivefold between 1950
and 1978.,' ' 3' The earlier free-rider problem remained, however, and agri-
cultural scientists were anxious to apply their new tools against "public" pests
such as the gypsy moth as well. 37 The increased availability of aircraft for
spraying after the war opened up the possibility of attacking forest pests and
made large scale spraying an option. 138
USDA sprayed some acreage itself, including public lands. These USDA
pesticide spray programs expanded significantly in the 1950s. 3 9 One major
focus of the USDA programs was gypsy moth control, leading to the spraying
of millions of acres of trees in the northeast with DDT.'40 Fire ants in the
,31 Professor Steven Bradford made a similar point concerning prisoners' dilemmas: as "the
only economics or game theory that most law professors and law students know, and
therefore they think that every policy issue in the world involves a prisoner's dilemma." C.
Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing: How to Write Law Review Articles for Fun and Profit,
44 J. LEGALEDUC. 13, 21 (1994) (citation omitted). His tongue-in-cheek advice was "[o]nce
you've created a prisoner's dilemma, you can forget about it. You've justified whatever type
of regulation you want to propose, and economics is no longer a problem." Id. at 22 (citation
omitted). The same seems to be true of externality and public good arguments.
'.. This section draws heavily on Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights,
Pesticides & Public Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2002) and Bosso, supra note 9, at 79-108.
136 RODGERS, supra note 9, at 399 (citation omitted).
'"See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
138 Oliver L. Wardman & Miles R. Thomas, Aerial Applications of Pesticides in the United
Kingdom. 1978 to 1998, 56 PEST. MGMT. SCI. 237, 237 (2000).
"' See Bosso, supra note 9, at 81-106 (discussing USDA widespread spraying to control the
gypsy moths and fire ants and the resulting public opposition in the 1950s).40 Bosso, supra note 9, at 82.
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southeast also got attention from USDA, with the 1957 Fire Ant Eradication
Act leading to a plan to "treat" twenty million acres, with the federal govern-
ment picking up half the expense to control this pest. 4' USDA argued that
fire ants were a major threat to agricultural production, animals, and even
human life.'42 By the end of the 1950s, however, government spray programs
began to provoke some public opposition and the government had begun to
restrict some uses of some chemicals, including DDT.'43
As one might expect, the first publicly-sponsored spraying programs
addressed the most urgent needs. As time went on, however, the bureaucrats
who benefitted from the expanded sizes and budgets of their agencies and
those who profited from the programs found reasons to expand beyond those
needs to more marginal cases. This expansion created opposition because as
the scale of spraying expanded, so too did the unintended side effects for non-
target species and other negative impacts.'"
One important reason for the problems with the public spray programs
was the lack of accountability of the agencies involved for the harm they
caused. Because USDA was not liable for the harms it caused to private
interests, as where it harmed wildlife and domestic animals, USDA did not
consider those effects in deciding when and how to spray. To take but one
example, USDA often used large scale application methods, such as aerial
application, to apply pesticides to huge acreages. '45 This is precisely the worst
way to apply pesticides if you are concerned with minimizing environmental
side effects. For example, the appropriate dose varies from field to field.
146
Uniform spraying thus results in overapplication to some fields. Instead of
large scale applications, spot spraying is an important means of reducing
environmental losses from pesticides. 147 Had USDA been liable for its
141 BOsso, supra note 9, at 87-88.
142 CARSON, supra note 2, at 162.
143 BOSSO, supra note 9, at 97-98, 100-01.
'" Id. at 84-85.
'4 See, e.g., id. at 82 (describing the aerial application of DDT in the case of the gypsy
moth). USDA also played an important role in developing aerial application methods. See
id. at 30 ("The USDA refined aerial spraying techniques during the war, which brought a
revolution of its own because farmers no longer needed to walk along the furrows,
laboriously applying arsenicals or leads by hand.").
146 j. Palti & R. Ausher, Crop Value, Economic Damage Thresholds, and Treatment
Thresholds, in ADVISORY WORK IN CROP PEST AND DISEASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 25,
at 48-49 ("[F]ield-to-field variation will necessitate separate prognoses for each field and
orchard, even when these are close neighbours [sic].").
"
7 See F. Van Den Berg et al., Emission of Pesticides into the Air, 115 WATER, AIR, & SOIL
POLLUTION 195, 196 (1999).
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trespass to the dissenting property owners whose property it sprayed, it would
have been forced to scale back the large scale applications in favor of spot
spraying. As a result, respecting property rights of land owners could have
produced a major improvement in environmental consequences without any
central direction or even consensus on the rationale for opposing the spray
programs. In short, had property rights been respected, even a few "cranks"
could have prevented the environmentally damaging and costly, large scale,
aerial spray programs.
As the negative impacts began to become clear, USDA's partners began
to refuse to participate. For example, when a Georgia veterinarian reported
that a dieldrin spray aimed at fire ants caused the deaths of more than one
hundred cattle, increasing numbers of farmers across the south refused to pay
for their share of spraying costs.' Even the Alabama legislature withdrew
funding for spraying in 1959 over concerns about the impact on the state's
wildlife population.'49 USDA responded with a "sale" on spray programs,
cutting the price by offering the chemicals for free to those who would take
them 5 and continuing to spray in some areas without local consent."' This
opposition meant that USDA was reaping less of a political reward for its
spray activities, leading to reduced agency interest in the programs, but the
programs had by now created their own supporters: chemical companies
selling pesticides to USDA, applicators applying them, and spray program
bureaucrats administering enhanced budgets.
The most famous spray campaign example is USDA's Long Island
attack on the gypsy moth, a critically important piece in the development of
the modern environmental political movement. During the 1950s, USDA
decided to spray millions of acres on Long Island, despite scant evidence of
gypsy moth presence. 52 In some respects, and considering the general atti-
1 : Bosso, supra note 9, at 102.49 Id.
5' Id. ("[I1n Texas the USDA literally gave heptachlor away to any property owner willing
to use it.").
'5' Id. (quoting a USDA spokesman).
52he government's own experts' testimony at the trial during which Long Island residents
attempted to block the spray program established that the threat from gypsy moths on Long
Island was minimal. The director of the Plant Pest Control Division of USDA, for example,
testified that prior to the spraying the infestation on Long Island was "light and scattered."
C.C. Alexander, Notes on DDT Case 18 (1958) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors
and available at the Cornell University Library) (testimony of Emory D. Burgess).
Nonetheless, USDA sprayed 600,000 acres to deal with forty-seven foci of infestation. Id.
Testimony at the same trial also established that using aerial spraying, USDA could not avoid
spraying the property of individuals who objected, as well as streams and ponds. Id. at 6, 8
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tude of the times, this program was undertaken for "environmental" reasons:
USDA wanted to save the forests on Long Island from the voracious gypsy
moth. 153
From the point of view of Long Island residents, USDA's methods left
a great deal to be desired.'54 First, the spray used was a mixture of DDT and
oil, which stuck to the trees, and blanketed the area.'55 Unfortunately, it also
stuck to cars, swimming pools, and houses.'56 Residents claimed there were
large fish kills caused by the indiscriminate spraying of ponds and streams as
well as forests. '57 Human health concerns relating to contaminated milk from
cows grazing on sprayed fields were also raised.1 8 These objections
culminated in the 1957 suit filed by Robert Cushman Murphy, an authority
on birds and curator-emeritus of the Museum of Natural History, together
with a group of other Long Island residents seeking to enjoin the spraying
program. Using common law property and tort theories, the plaintiffs
challenged USDA's ability to deprive them "of property and possibly lives
without due process of law and [take] their private property for public use
without just compensation" and claimed the spraying program was a
"trespass upon the persons and property of the plaintiffs. ... "
The plaintiffs lost the first suit and the spraying continued.' 6 In rejecting
the plaintiffs' claim for relief, the trial judge ruled that the support of public
agencies for the spray program outweighed the plaintiffs' property rights. 6'
The judge found that "[s]uch a formulation of informed opinion could not be
ignored ... and the research conducted by the trained staffs of both Federal
and New York State departments was directed to an intelligent program
designed to deal with the realities of a perplexing situation."' 62 With a
(testimony of Boyd R. Opheim and Alexander Barrett Klots) (A USDA employee testified
that "it would be inconvenient and expensive to eradicate gypsy moths by ground sprays,
though not impossible."). Another witness testified that ground spraying cost $25 per acre
compared to $1 per acre for aerial spraying. Id. at 18 (testimony of Emory D. Burgess). The
contracts for the aerial spraying were arranged in Washington, not on Long Island. Id. at 21
testimony of William L. Popham).
53 Bosso, supra note 9, at 84-85.
154 Id. at 82.
155 Id.
156 THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 87 (1982).
157 Id.
'
58 See id.; see also Murphy v. Butler, 362 U.S. 929, 930 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15 Murphy v. Benson, 151 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
60 Id. at 792; BosSo, supra note 9, at 83.
161 Murphy, 151 F. Supp. at 792.
162id.
[Vol. 28:35
MARKET PRINCIPLES FOR PESTICIDES
significant public benefit shown by agency testimony and the failure of the
plaintiffs to show that there was a threat of irreparable damage to them in
excess of what the community would suffer from the gypsy moth, the judge
refused the injunction.'63
The group tried again the following year, armed with more evidence of
dangers of DDT exposure."6 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims yet
again, this time holding that they only complained of an "annoyance" rather
than alleging sufficient harm to warrant damages. 65 Their annoyance was
outweighed by the greater good of the spray program: "The rights of
individuals are not limitless. Individuals must yield to the requirements of the
public as a whole."'66 Although the plaintiffs appealed, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals quickly held the case moot on the grounds that the spraying
program was over for the year. 1
67
The trial record gives some insights into the marginal benefit of the
government spray programs at this point: by the government's own estimates
at trial, it dealt with a "light and scattered" set of fewer than fifty infestation
foci of gypsy moths by spraying six hundred thousand acres at a cost of at
least $600,000.168 This is an extraordinary sum since, even using the govern-
ment's own cost figures for ground spraying costs, the entire problem could
have been avoided if those forty-seven foci occupied fewer than twenty-four
thousand acres. 169 Since a "light and scattered" infestation could hardly have
been anything close to twenty-four thousand acres, the government chose a
means of conducting the program that harmed the Long Island plaintiffs
and cost it more money than the alternative. Why? We can only speculate
that the opportunity to spray met other needs for USDA, such as rewarding
the contractor who did the spraying.
1'63 Id.
' See Murphy v. Benson, 164 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).1651 d. at 126, 129.
'6Id. at 128.
167 Murphy v. Benson, 270 F.2d 419, 420 (2d Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, although Justice William 0. Douglas dissented from the denial, arguing the issue
was not moot because spraying could resume and the damage from DDT was not understood
well enough for the courts to dismiss the possibility of danger. Murphy v. Benson, 362 U.S.
929, 931-35 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'
68 See Alexander, supra note 152, at 18 (testimony of Emory D. Burgess).
169 The government estimated ground spraying costs at $25 per acre. Alexander, supra note
152, at 18. Since the government was spending $600,000 on aerial spraying, anything less
would have been a savings. Dividing $600,000 by $25/acre yields twenty-four thousand
acres. So long as the government had to spray less than twenty-four thousand acres to get the
forty-seven foci, it would have saved money.
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In economic terms, USDA's overall behavior is easy to understand.
Congress and the agency had incentives to maximize the net political benefits
of spraying. The first spray programs were conducted where the marginal
political benefits of spraying were largest, such as controlling malaria and
other insect-borne diseases. As the program expanded, however, spraying
extended into areas with lower marginal political and environmental benefits
such as gypsy moth control. Similarly, the spraying programs were first done
where the marginal political costs of spraying were lowest (over swamps) and
expanded into areas where the marginal political costs increased (inhabited
areas). Even if nothing else had changed, this dynamic would have eventually
led to the spray programs' expansion to a point where the benefits fell below
the costs of continuing to expand the program, including the opportunity cost
of foregone alternative uses for the tax money spent on the spray programs.
Increased public opposition, as the public learned of the health and environ-
mental damages the sprays could be causing, brought a more rapid decline in
the total political benefits. As a result, Congressional and agency support for
them also fell.
There are two important lessons from the spray programs of the 1950s
and 1960s: respect property rights and publicly-provided goods are often
oversupplied, with negative consequences for the environment.
1. Respect Private Property Rights
The programs caused major problems because the government refused
to respect private property rights. If USDA had been required to respect
property owners' rights, it could not have continued its mass eradication
programs of aerial spraying once the environmental costs became clear. Only
by overriding property rights was the environmental damage caused possible.
This illustrates a crucial point about government action: governments
are effective because they can coerce people, and coercion is sometimes
cheaper than buying agreements. Coercion lowers the price of coordinating
activity. As environmental economist Ian Wills notes, "[i]t is government's
coercive power that makes the difference; planners have no other major
advantage over market exchange in coordinating production and con-
sumption."170 Respecting property rights, by requiring governments to obtain
consent or compensate rights holders for takings of private property, is a
tT0 WILLS, supra note 11, at 104.
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critical constraint on the capture of the coercive power of government by
special interests.17'
2. Oversupply of Publicly Provided Goods
The natural consequence of providing the spray as a public good meant
that the programs would continue to expand as USDA bureaucracy and
interest groups that benefitted from the programs sought to keep the benefits
they received from the political process. As a result, we need to think
seriously about agencies being captured before entrusting policy decisions to
them. When policies offer benefits concentrated on a few while dispersing the
cost over many, we should expect to see such captures resulting in un-
desirable program expansion. The government spray programs are a clear
example of this problem. An important protection against such over-
expansion of government programs is forcing the government to respect
property rights. Where governments must compensate property owners for
lost rights, actions taking the rights are put "on budget" and considered by the
agencies involved.'72
C. DDT & Malaria17
3
Malaria is a significant public health problem today in much of the
developing world. 74 DDT is a particularly valuable weapon in the fight
171 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 332 (1985); see also Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for
Environmental Purposes: The Takings Implications of Government-Authorized Aerial
Pesticide Spraying, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65 (1999) (examining the implications of property
takings challenges in response to government aerial sprayings).
112 See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The "Living Consti-
tution, "the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 807-08
2000) (describing importance of putting environmental programs "on budget").71Seegenerally Morriss & Meiners, supra note 135 (expanding the material presented here).
7' Hundreds of millions of people suffer from malaria and millions of families lose infants
to malaria--one researcher termed it the equivalent of "filling seven Boeing 747s with
children, and then crashing them, every day." Amir Attaran et al., Balancing Risks on the
Backs of the Poor, 6 NATURE 729, 729 (2000). Malaria kills a child every thirty seconds.
Children who survive malaria past infancy "suffer an average of six bouts each year, making
[it] the most common cause of school absenteeism." UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND,
ROLLING BACK MALARIA 4 (1999), available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/
pubrollback_malaria en.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). Adult sufferers miss an average
often working days a year. Martin H. Villet, Malaria Epidemic in KwaZulu-NatalandDDT
The Facts (2000), email posted on Malaria Foundation International, at http://www.malaria.
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against malaria and other insect-bome diseases.'75 Unfortunately, the ban on
DDT use in many countries and growing international pressure to end its
use 176 and manufacture worldwide have allowed malaria to make a comeback.
The result is that a disease on the way to extinction is back in strength.
Controlling malaria requires controlling mosquitoes because the disease
is transmitted by parasites carried by mosquitoes. 77 The key to malaria
control is thus to kill infected mosquitoes before they can transmit the
parasite to humans through bites, not using DDT handicaps these malaria
control efforts. Before DDT was in use, malaria was estimated to infect three
hundred and fifty million people in 1952.78 With the use of DDT, the
infection rate fell by ninety-seven percent by 1969, largely because of DDT
sprayed inside homes and on mosquito breeding sites. 179 Now, after the wide
use of DDT was discontinued for environmental concerns, the disease is
nearly back to where it was fifty years ago. 80 The British medical journal,
The Lancet, recently reviewed the evidence on the impact of stopping the use
of DDT and concluded that when DDT spraying is ended, malaria's incidence
org/news227.htmnl (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
171-Attaran et al., supra note 174, at 729 (noting that DDT is "one of the few affordable,
effective tools against the mosquitoes that transmit malaria").
176 For example, environmental pressure groups have succeeded in making DDT unavailable
for malaria control in many countries, while conceding that DDT's usefulness against malaria
requires "special attention and caution." Klaus Topfer, Working Together for a POPs Treaty
for the Next Millennium, Opening Remarks at the Third Session of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Sept. 6, 1999), at
http://www.pops.int/documents/press/prel-spch/SpeechTopfer.htrrL The number of countries
using DDT has been whittled down to nineteen. See INT'L POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK,
DDT & MALARIA: ANSWERS TO COMMON QUESTIONS 1 (2001), at http://ipen.ecn.cz
/index.php?z=&L=en&k=download&r--default&id=6 (last visited Sept. 15, 2003). The
pesticide is produced in only two countries and is becoming difficult to obtain. Id. The UN
seeks a global ban by treaty. Governing Council Dec. 13C, U.N. Env't Programme, 19th
Sess., paras. 2, 4 (1997), available at http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/ gcpops_e.html
("[I]nternational action, including a global legally binding instrument, is required to reduce
the risks to human health and the environment arising from the release of the twelve specified
persistent organic pollutants [including DDT].").
_ See Titus Bradley, Malaria andDrug Resistance, at http://www.micro.msb.le.ac.uk/224/
Bradley/Bradley.htnml (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
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rises markedly.8 1 The disease has returned to areas in which it previously had
been eradicated. 8
2
DDT is not the only means of combating malarial mosquitoes. The other
means are strikingly less effective, however. The current international anti-
malarial effort, Roll Back Malaria ("RBM"), for example, uses "insecticide-
treated mosquito nets, mosquito coils, repellents and other materials; early
detection, containment and prevention of malaria epidemics; and strengthen-
ing of local capacity to monitor malaria in affected regions."'1 3 The difference
between RBM and DDT use is clear from RBM's goal: merely to reduce
infant mortality from the disease, not its incidence, by fifty percent by
2010.184 Compared to the ninety-seven percent reduction in disease achieved
decades ago with DDT, RBM's goal seems painfully inadequate. Moreover,
the alternatives promoted by RBM cost more and are less effective than
DDT. s5 For example, mosquito sleeping nets cost $5 to $10 each,8 6 making
them expensive for people in countries where per capita personal income is
measured in the hundreds of dollars per year. And, because the nets require
continual retreatment (soaking the nets in insecticide, something that must be
done by the nets' owners), there is increased human exposure.8 7
One reason DDT appeared to be so harmful in the 1950s and 1960s was
due to its widespread use in heavy dosages, mostly from government spray
campaigns but also from overuse by private sprayers who had not learned
proper application techniques. Heavy doses produce more environmental
's D.R. Roberts et al., DDTHouse Spraying and Re-Emerging Malaria, 356 LANCET 330,
331 (2000) ("When a malaria-endemic country stops using DDT, there is a cessation or great
reduction in numbers of houses sprayed with insecticides, and this is accompanied by rapid
growth of malaria burden within the country.").18ld.
s UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 174, at 8.
4 See Roll Back Malaria homepage, at http://www.rbm.who.int/newdesign2/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2003).
'
5 Villet, supra note 174. Delegates to a World Health Organization conference on DDT use
in Africa in Harare, Zimbabwe in 2000, for example, issued a statement expressing the "deep
concerns of the participating member states on the possible economic and health implications
of any restriction made on DDT use for malaria control." Malaria Found. Int'l, Delegates'
Report of the Regional Consultation to Prepare African Countries Towards Reduction of
Reliance on DDTfor Malaria Control, Harare, Zimbabwe, Feb. 8-10, 2000, available at
http://www.malaria.org/ddtreduceaf.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003); see also The WHO
Cabinet Project, Roll Back Malaria Financial Situation (Dec. 1, 1999), at http://mosquito.
who.int/docs/3gpm_ fmancial.htm (outlining the expenses of treating malaria without using
DDT).
8 6 UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 174, at 3.
187 See id.
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impact. 8' Even if DDT is sprayed from the air for mosquitoes, the volume
and frequency used today is far less than common agricultural practices in
earlier years."' The primary use today, however, is a much more limited
one-an interior spray in houses in areas at risk for malaria. 0
Why do so many people oppose the use of DDT to control a major
health threat such as malaria? The most public opponents of DDT use, even
if they concede a limited role for it in the present, are United States
environmental pressure organizations. 9' Their case against DDT for malaria
control is that any use will lead to expanded uses for illegitimate purposes. '92
Such an argument proves too much, however, since it is true of almost any
potentially dangerous substance that a total ban can reduce harm from
illegitimate use.'93 A more likely motive, however, is that the initial ban on
DDT remains an important symbolic victory for environmental pressure
groups. The ban of DDT in the United States took a lengthy and bitter fight
and a major triumph for the new environmental movement. Indeed, the
Environmental Defense Fund (now Environmental Defense), one of the most
188 Attaran, supra note 174, at 729 ("The fault for this lies in the massive agricultural use of
DDT. Dusting a single 1 00-hectare cotton field, for example, can require more than 1,100
kg of DDT over 4 weeks."(citation omitted)).
18 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Mosquito Killer, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2001, at 42, 50.
goAttaran, supra note 174, at 729 ("The current practice is to spray the interior surfaces only
of houses at risk, leaving a residue of DDT at a concentration of 2 g/m2 on the walls, ceiling
and eaves, once or twice a year. Half a kilogram can treat a large house and protect all its
inhabitants."). Indoor spraying was already a crucial part of the antimalaria campaign by the
1950s. Gladwell, supra note 189, at 50.
'9' A review of websites offered by major environmental organizations (Audubon, EDF,
NRDC and WWF) indicates nothing but an historical interest in DDT. It is simply to be listed
as a chemical that everyone knows is bad. Greenpeace sponsors protests at the few factories
in nations where DDT is still produced. Roger Bate, Without DDT, Malaria Strikes Back,
SPIKED SCI. (Apr. 24,2001), athttp://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/ 000000005591.htm.
The World Wildlife Federation is also pushing to eliminate all use of DDT. Richard Tren &
Roger Bate, When Politics Kills: Malaria and the DDT Story 23 (2001), at http://216.
156.132.11 /PDFs/Malaria.pdf. To be fair, there has been a quiet pulling back from the
advocacy of a total ban by most environmental organizations which now argue for a
transition to other "less damaging" pesticides.
'92 Roberts et al., supra note 181, at 331 ("[E]nvironmentalists are still seeking a global ban
arguing that if DDT is produced for use in improving public health, it will also be used for
agiculture and lead to global pollution of the environment."(citation omitted)).
' Indeed, the argument is strikingly similar to that made against the medical use of
marijuana, or even studying such uses, a position many environmental pressure group
members would presumably disagree with because of its implications for reducing individual
freedom. See, e.g., The War on Drugs: Fighting Crime or Wasting Time?, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1537, 1560-61 (2001) (comments of Congressman Bob Barr in response to a question
on why he opposes medical marijuana referenda in the District of Columbia).
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effective groups, grew out of the initial campaign against DDT spraying on
Long Island.'94
There are others who benefit from restricting or eliminating DDT use,
including the manufacturers of substitute pesticides, which are more ex-
pensive and less effective than DDT.'95 DDT is cheap because it has long
since lost patent protection and can be made by anyone without payment of
royalties. '96
This instance of environmental advocacy seems to have won
approval of powerful pesticide companies because it allows
them to sell their more expensive insecticides. The
replacement ofDDT by organophosphate, carbamate, or pyre-
throid insecticides is commonly proposed even though price,
efficacy, duration of effectiveness, and side-effects ([for
example] unpleasant smell), are major barriers to their use in
poor countries.'97
There are several lessons from the malaria story.
1. Symbolic Politics Have No Place in Government Environmental
Policy
Symbolism is a critical part of political discourse. Making decisions
based on symbols is not unusual in political decision-making. Symbolic
politics are, however, a strikingly bad means of allocating resources through
the political process. In the case of DDT and malaria, for example, symbols
kill.
Symbolic acts are, on the other hand, perfectly appropriate for indi-
viduals. Consumers can demand products that are pesticide-free, even if such
products have no objective benefits' and are inferior to fruits and vegetables
grown with pesticides in other dimensions, solely because they want to
'9 DUNLAP, supra note 156, at 142-200 (discussing history of DDT suits and EDF).
'
95Attaran, supra note 174, at 730 (explaining that Malathion, the next cheapest alternative,
costs three times as much to apply as DDT).
See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 135, at 26.
197 Roberts et al., supra note 181, at 331.
We offer this example purely for the sake of argument. There may well be such benefits.
Our point is that even if there are not, the act may still be a valid one as an individual
symbolic action.
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support pesticide-free agriculture as a symbolic gesture. In this case the
individual bears the costs of her decision: if organic produce is not superior
to non-organic produce, she will be paying more for an inferior product. The
problem occurs when some people use government's coercive power to
impose costs on others to achieve a symbolic act. In that case, the special
interest group members do not bear the full costs of their actions, and
consequently buy too much of the symbol. Where the symbols have real
costs, as with DDT and malaria, this is unacceptable.
2. One-Size-Fits-All Policies Are Inferior to Federalism
Solutions that work for one place may not work for another, as local
conditions matter. Local knowledge matters in many ways. For example, the
vulnerability of groundwater to pesticide contamination "depends on the
unique combination of local conditions."' 99 As USDA pesticide official Allan
Jennings noted in 1988, many pesticide problems vary from location to loca-
tion creating "the issue of how to effectively restrict pesticide usage where
the problems exist."2" Removing pesticide decisions to the lowest possible
level is thus superior to centralizing them so long as local decision makers
have adequate information available to them. Producing and disseminating
information is, therefore, an important means of improving pesticide decision
making.
D. Drift
The objective of pesticide delivery can generally be regarded as "the
placement on targets of just sufficient of a selected active ingredient to
achieve a desired biological result with safety and economy." '' Unfortunate-
ly, pesticides applied to a crop on one property sometimes end upon another
property, where they can cause harm.202 Herbicides commonly used on cotton,
for example, are harmful to corn. Applying a pesticide to one crop can result
in harm to a neighboring field's crop when the pesticide drifts across the
'99Allan L. Jennings, EPA Regulatory Thrusts and Impact on Pesticide Usage, in IMPROVING
ON-TARGET PLACEMENT OF PESTICIDES 31, 33 (Agric. Research Inst. ed., 1988).
" Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
201 Downer, supra note 71, at 5 (citation omitted).
202 Drift has significant environmental impacts:
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boundary between the fields and gets on the wrong crop. Reduced yields are
the most common result in those circumstances. Urban-rural boundaries also
produce drift complaints where agricultural sprays contaminate urban gardens
and property. Beyond losses in application, other emissions of pesticides that
contribute to drift also occur, including emissions from the plant, and
volatilization of the pesticide after application.2"3 These losses can be
substantial as well, with up to fifty to sixty percent lost in this fashion.2" As
with other problems with pesticides, reducing drift involves tradeoffs
between solving one problem and increasing another.0 5
Disputes over drift have been a feature of agricultural life since spraying
began." 6 Drift problems are the result of the relatively low efficiencies of
pesticide application, whereby only small percentages of the active ingredient
reach the target pests. 20 7 Many states have well-developed bodies of tort law
dealing with drift damage. The surprising thing about pesticide drift cases
is that there are so few of them, given the volume of pesticides applied to
American crops. One reason for this is that many state governments provide
services to help resolve disputes over drift.
One of the authors (Morriss) worked for the Texas Department of
Agriculture ("TDA") during law school as an intern. TDA had then recently
passed from the control of the rural wing of the state Democratic party, and
a particularly obtuse Agriculture Commissioner named Reagan Brown, to the
control of the left wing of the state Democratic party, with the election of Jim
A key issue is the risk of "spray drift" beyond the field boundary,
especially if there is another crop susceptible to a herbicide, there is
surface water or a ditch which could be contaminated by the pesticide, or
there are bees downwind of insecticide-treated fields. Protection of
hedgerows around fields is also of crucial importance to avoid
contaminating the habitat of important populations of natural enemies.
Field boundaries are also important habitats for game birds and
conservation of other wildlife.
MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 14 (citations omitted).
203 See generally Van Den Berg et al., supra note 147 (discussing the various types of
pesticide emissions and relevant dynamics).
0 Id. at 213.
205 MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 19 ("There can be a conflict between optimising the spray
qouality for efficient application of a pesticide and endeavoring to minimise the risk ofdrift.").
2 See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 135 (discussing drift cases).
207 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 18 (discussing this problem); G.A. Matthews,
Improved Systems of Pesticide Application, 295 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYALSOC'YLONDON
(SERIES B, BIOLOGICAL SCI.) 163, 163 (1981) ("Sometimes over 99% of the pesticide fails
to reach the intended target.").
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Hightower.218 Hightower had made a name for himself by campaigning
against the fire ant program's indiscriminate use of pesticides.'0 9 Hightower
generally concentrated on positive aspects of the agency, such as increasing
marketing of Texas produce.210 He also inherited the main state pesticide
regulatory efforts-then locked in a 1950s-era bureaucracy. Hightower
wanted change in pesticide policy to satisfy his urban, environmentalist
constituency, but he also needed to not alienate the agricultural community,
which was highly suspicious of him, if he wanted to be reelected, so he tread
fairly cautiously."'
As part of the internship, Morriss went on some pesticide investigations
with the chief inspector, Al Hemandez. During a typical investigation, they
would visit some neighboring farmers, one of whom alleged that the other's
pesticides had drifted onto his fields, causing harm to his crops. This sort of
thing was common as there were hundreds of such complaints a year resulting
from having adjacent crops that required incompatible pesticides.
On each investigation, the same thing would happen. When everyone
had gathered in a field to look over the alleged damage, and shook hands all
around, each person would glance down at the others' hands. Usually every-
one but Morriss would have a large, gold, Texas A&M ring.2 12 Morriss's lack
of a ring would most times cause a visible step back by the others, with a
further step back when Hemandez would mention Morriss was a Yankee law
student attending the University of Texas. The chill would only go away
when Hernandez assured everyone that despite this failing, he considered
Morriss "OK." The community of interest that the Aggie ring signified was
critical to TDA's ability to play a constructive role in these situations.
Second, the TDA inspectors played the role of impartial arbiters and
documentors of events-sometimes all it took was the inspector opining that
it indeed did look like some broadleaf herbicide had gotten onto the cotton
28 For a general discussion of Hightower's approach, see Ronald B. Taylor, Texas' New-
Style Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower Carries His Message of a New Populist
Movement Nationwide, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1985, at 40.
2 See William Schneider, An Insider's View of the Election, ATLANTIC ON-LINE, July 1988,
available athttp://www.theatlantic.com/politics/policamp/insider.htm; see also Jan Reid, The
Fire Ant, Tx. MONTHLY.COM, available at http://www.texasmonthly.com/ranch/readme
/ants.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
20 Taylor, supra note 208.
211 Id.
2' For a discussion of the history of the Aggie ring, see The Ass'n of Former Students of
Texas A&M Univ., Aggie Website, athttp://www.aggienetwork.com/ring/timeline.aspx (last
visited Sept. 15, 2003).
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field as evidenced by the swath of sickly looking plants for a couple of
hundred feet into the field or noting that nearby weather stations reported
gusting winds on the day the applicator had sprayed the wheat field, to satisfy
everyone that some compensation was owed.
Most of the incidents went no further-TDA served as recorder, which
helped with insurance companies, and expert adjudicator, making sure that
a bad crop was not improperly blamed on a neighbor instead of the drought
or bad seed. Once in a great while, lawsuits were filed. In those cases, usually
involving larger amounts of alleged damage, the tort system worked reason-
ably well.
The cases that did not fit within the "easy-to-solve-amongst-us-Aggies"
paradigm were the urban exposure cases. These usually happened on the
borders of town and country, where individuals experienced drift onto their
gardens, laundry, houses, and persons. Missing from these cases was the
reciprocal nature of rural life, where one drift incident went from my field to
yours, the next from yours to mine, and so on. Townspeople might not use
pesticides in their gardens, and certainly did not do so from airplanes, and felt
understandably strongly about being sprayed with what they saw as danger-
ous poisons that they often felt no one had any business using.
Town and country cases were harder to resolve, in part because it was
harder to resolve the value of the harm. Agreeing amongst farmers on the
value of a ten percent reduction from ten rows of cotton is easier than
agreeing about the value of the loss of an organic garden between an organic
gardener who has gone to considerable trouble to create one and a farmer
who thinks organic foods are for fools who do not value progress. TDA never
figured out a good way to resolve those cases. The values asserted were
incompatible and the most the agency could offer was to allow the parties
involved to vent their feelings to the inspectors and, hopefully, facilitate the
parties in working something out.
There are three lessons from our drift "fable."
1. Many Pesticide Problems Have Local Dimensions as Well as
Potentially Having Broader Dimensions
Sometimes we focus on the global problem of residues in Antarctic
penguins and forget that those residues generally got there by migrating off
the property of someone who thought the pesticides were doing some good
on her property. When those pesticides migrate, they often pass through the
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property of an immediate neighbor long before dispersing into the environ-
ment and making their way to Antarctica and the penguins. Those local
problems are not the complete set of problems, but they are the easiest set to
solve. This suggests that perhaps we should begin with institutions that
address local problems first before tackling the really hard ones. Solving
the local problems also can significantly reduce environmental harm from
pesticide use: solving boundary problems, for example, has major environ-
mental benefits.1 3
2. Local Institutions Do a Good Job of Solving Local Problems Because
Local Institutions Have Knowledge About Local Conditions-
Knowledge That is Important to Understanding the Problem
The local TDA inspectors and the farmers knew the reputations of the
different applicators, their equipment, soil conditions, and so on, information
that enabled them to make judgments that were impossible for people in
Austin, let alone Washington, D.C., to make. The people in Austin and
Washington might have been smarter, known more science, or had more
degrees, but they lacked the local knowledge needed to make good decisions
in a cotton field near Floydada, Texas. Further, those farmers were right to
look for an Aggie ring on TDA employees, and right to pull back when they
did not see one. The lack of a ring meant someone was not part of their
community and should not, could not have been trusted without some further
indicia of trustworthiness. That person lacked the local knowledge necessary
to solve their problems.
Markets can solve problems: entrepreneurs have come up with methods
to prevent drift problems. New technologies to reduce drift include shrouds,
wind foils, air-assisted sprayers, variable-rate nozzles, chemical additives to
mixtures to that change spray characteristics, and others.214 The possibility of
23 Finney, supra note 19, at 70.
Perhaps the most dramatic short-term ecological improvements will arise
from increased attention to the management of field boundaries and other
uncropped land. These areas are crucially important to wildlife and
sensitive management, often involving use of appropriate selective
herbicides, can lead to rapid and sustainable improvements in species
diversity.
Id.
214 Downer, supra note 71, at 6; Matthews, supra note 207, at 171 ("In the future, on larger
farms, there may be advanced vehicles with computer controls of flow rate, droplet size,
charge: mass ratio and swath width, the appropriate chemical being selected in relation to the
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solving these problems lures new entrants into the market."' Substantial
improvements in controlling drift can be made by adopting these techniques.
Other improvements are also reducing other environmental problems." 6
In short, the environmental problems caused by pesticides are largely the
result of off-target deposition. Drift onto neighboring crops is the most acute
form of this;2 7 bioaccumulation of the pesticide in non-target species is
another. Reducing one, however, can lead to reductions in others as well.
Moreover, the size of the losses from both application drift and post-
application volatilization are sufficiently large given the price of pesticides,
so that reducing them offers a significant opportunity for profit.
3. Value Conflicts are Hardest to Solve
An important lesson concerns the hard problems that come from
conflicting values-both the urban-rural divide and the organic gardener-
cotton farmer divide, are a product of fundamental conflicts in values. The
contrasting images in the 1970s debates over pesticides of rural pesticide
users volunteering to drink or bathe in their sprays to demonstrate their safety
and organic produce advocates clad in natural fibers warning of "silent
1 nPut of crop monitoring data.").See, e.g., Harold C. Simmons, The Role of Industry in Developing Innovative Spraying
Equipment, in IMPROVING ON-TARGET PLACEMENT OF PESTICIDES, supra note 199
(describing interest of Parker Hannifin Corp., a company with $2 billion annual sales, in
market despite previous lack of experience in pesticides because of record in developing
spray equipment).
2 6 Finney, supra note 19, at 69.
[N]ewproducts are being developed with physiochemical properties which
will make them less mobile and less persistent in the environment.
Substantial improvements are also being made to formulations and
packaging, especially a trend away from liquids to solid granular
formulations, which should significantly reduce accidental point-source
contamination of the environment through spillage.
Id. Technological change also causes shifts in application methods. Aerial application, which
produces more off-target deposition and drift than most other methods ofapplication, became
common after World War II. Improvements in ground spraying equipment led to a later
decline in aerial application. Wardman & Thomas, supra note 138, at 243.
2"7 One estimate suggested that thirty percent of the quantity applied is typically lost to drift
in aerial foliar insecticide applications. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVT'L PROT.
AGENCY, A STUDY OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE USE OF PESTICIDES IN AGRICULTURE 10,
fig. 1 (1975). Ten percent is estimated to be lost to volatilization, leaching and surface
transport, fifteen percent to application off the target crop, and forty-one percent to off the
target insect, but on target crop. Id. Clearly there are major efficiencies to be gained by
improving these figures.
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springs" was not evidence that rural America was something out of the movie
Deliverance218 or that all those concerned with pesticides had yet to get over
Woodstock. The dispute was caused by different value choices, different
information sets, and different weighting of risks and benefits. Those are
hard problems-and they are not made easier to solve by handing them to
the federal government to resolve in a winner-take-all fashion through the
political process. Such problems are best left to levels of government closer
to communities likely to share values and to decentralized decision making
that allows different solutions for different communities.
4. Federalism Works
Moreover, voluntary methods can reduce such conflicts. Application
technique plays a significant role in the proportion of a pesticide application
that reaches the pest and the proportion that ends up off-target and "in" the
environment. Off-target drift is waste, something that all participants have
an incentive to reduce. Doing so can even yield marketing benefits: Con-
sumer pressure for lower chemical use has led to "Consumers Charters" in
Australia, for example, in which growers pledge to reduce their use of
chemicals and comply by reducing off-target waste.219
In addition to value conflicts, pesticide use presents problems for
tradeoffs. Our final lesson from the drift fable is that tradeoffs exist.
5. Tradeoffs Exist
Controlling drift is a problem that requires trading off different aspects
of control. Most obviously, stopping drift generally requires substituting the
risk of less than complete coverage of the target field for the risk of drift. This
can be accomplished by simple methods (stop spraying before the edge of the
21 DELIVERANCE (Warner Bros. 1972).
219 Jones et al., supra note 36, at 176. Jones and his co-authors note that significant reductions
in bioregulators can be achieved through research into more efficient application methods.
There should be a reduction of the amount of active bioregulator
ingredient used per hectare by at least 25% as a result of the use of more
efficient spray application technology. Bioregulator application dosages
could be reduced by a further 25% as a result of spraying at the most
effective time. There is evidence to show that correct application timing
can allow the reduction of the dosage of bioregulator used by up to 50%.
Id. at 179-80.
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target field, do not spray when the wind is blowing hard) or more complex
changes (altering droplet size). Less obviously, some of these methods can
increase other environmental harms. Reducing off-site drift ("exo-drift"), for
example, may entail techniques that increase on-site-but-off-target appli-
cation ("endo-drift") through changes in droplet size that alter leaf reten-
tion.220
This is an example of larger problems in pesticide policy. The decisions
are not simply dichotomous: food or environment, bugs or people, poison or
savior. Using any particular pesticide is a choice not to undertake alternative
actions. It is rare that any one choice is purely beneficial or harmful for the
environment. Persistent pesticides reduce exposure to applicators but increase
problems for wildlife; broad spectrum pesticides kill more pests but also have
more impact on beneficial insects; no till agriculture reduces erosion but
increases herbicide use. The "environmental" choice is likely to differ from
place to place and time to time.
IV. PRINCIPLES
To put these lessons to work, we offer five principles for pesticide policy
and environmental policy more broadly:
* Avoid the nirvana fallacy.
* Facilitate the use of local knowledge. Government's role is to
facilitate information sharing and the development of local
institutions.
* Recognize existing explicit and implicit property rights claims.
* Solve the easy problems first.
* Get the incentives right.
Using these principles would allow the development of a new pesticide policy
that we argue would have less environmentally damaging consequences than
our current policy.
The first step is to avoid both the false nirvanas of regulatory solutions
and the despairing and equally false apocalyptic predictions that have haunted
American pesticide policy. A realistic assessment of institutions is vital to an
effective policy. Assuming that EPA will be able to amass and digest the
220 Matthews & Thomas, supra note 68, at 975 ("To avoid increasing endo-drift and also
minimise the risk of downwind exo-drift there is a need for optimisation of droplet size
within the crop and for ensuring that droplets impact on foliage within the treated area, so
that minimal dosages are effective.").
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relevant data and decide the status of every pesticide in use on every crop in
a coherent and rational way in a very short time is one example of a nirvana
fallacy. Assuming that pesticide users will simply stop using pesticides while
this process goes on is another.
Moreover, even if EPA could respond coherently to such demands,
centralizing regulatory decision making costs us the local knowledge that is
critical to making good decisions. For example, allowing American prefer-
ences on DDT to dictate its use in malaria-ridden countries is a recipe for bad
decisions. Within the United States, making decisions in Washington, D.C.
(or Austin, Texas or Columbus, Ohio) loses important information available
in Junction, Texas and Columbia Station, Ohio. Some information can be
known in Washington, Austin, and Columbus-scientific information about
the impact of a chemical on birds, for example. But knowing things about
specific fields also makes a difference in the environmental impact of
pesticide use. Pushing decision making towards local institutions is thus
usually preferable to central planning. That does not mean that the federal
government has no role. It can play an important part in facilitating infor-
mation flow, developing information, and fostering local institutions.
Increases in knowledge take time and the recognition of the importance
of issues. For example, not until the 1960s and 1970s did agricultural
economists focus on the economic threshold for pesticide use.22' Once such
work began, however, it quickly grew more sophisticated.222 More knowledge
can mean problems are solved.
In addition to fostering local institutions generally, pesticide policy
should foster the most local institution of all: property rights. We should be
attempting to find ways to define new property rights where they do not exist.
Technology can help with this;223 the most important thing is to favor
solutions that recognize existing property rights claims and foster the creation
of new ones. Migratory bird problems, for example, might be addressed by
giving title to specific bird flocks, identified through DNA sampling and
microchip implants, to bird watchers. Other aspects of environmental
protection for migratory birds have been solved through private initiatives
built around property rights, such as the prairie pothole program run by
221 Osteen, supra note 25, at 268.
222 Id. at 269.
223 Richard S. Cahoon & Ron Herring, Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, "Bioproperty"
and Novel Schemes for Wild Biota Conservation, in THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
(Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill eds., 2001).
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Ducks Unlimited.224 Governments can facilitate such solutions in a variety of
ways.
We should not let the existence of hard problems that we cannot
immediately solve prevent us from tackling the easy problems. There are
many in pesticides, starting with the destructive role of agricultural subsidy
programs around the world. Transforming the debate over such programs into
an environmental issue could be helpful in overcoming the entrenched special
interest that block change in the United States and abroad. Solving some of
those problems, such as drift and overly-intensive farming in response to the
subsidy program structure, may solve some of the harder problems for us.
Finally, the most important principle is to get the incentives right.
Incentives matter and they can have a major impact. The agricultural chem-
icals business is highly competitive. 2 5 The development of new techniques
that reduce pesticide use, saving the farmer money and reducing environ-
mental impacts, is increasing as entrepreneurs recognize these techniques as
a source of profits.226 The competitive edge the companies gain is a powerful
motivating force for improving pesticides by reducing environmental
impacts. For example, over- and under-application is a problem where
equipment is not precisely calibrated. "Monitors that sense speed and flow
rate and have inputs for application width can continuously display the
application rate. Servo-control units that automatically control the application
rate with changes in travel speed are now available also., 227 Market pressures
are also changing pesticide use, as consumers demand foods that meet higher
standards of safety.228 Pesticide companies can offer package services to
control pests rather than simply selling particular chemicals, allowing them
greater control over conditions of use and providing them with the oppor-
tunity to control for resistance development and other factors.229
224 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to
Federalism, 9 S.CT. ECON. REv. 205, 237 (2001).
225 Green, supra note 36, at 176.
226 See, e.g., Blazquez et al., supra note 30, at 117 ("In the United States, large-scale adoption
of [computerized pest management] schemes may be expected in the near future, as
commercial firms move into the pest information delivery field at an accelerating pace.").
227 Butler & Bode, supra note 128, at 264.
228 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 5 ("In practice, those marketing the produce (the
supermarkets and food processing companies), are having a greater influence on pesticide
use by insisting on specific management programmes.").
229 See E.E. Bernet, The Project Approach to Crop Protection, 295 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON (SERIES B, BIOLOGICAL SCI.) 199 (1981) (describing Ciba-Geigy's
approach to selling such package services).
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V. CONCLUSION
For much of the last century, pesticide use in the United States has been
regulated under a central planning approach. Whether it was apple growers
in the Pacific Northwest not using enough pesticides or farmers in the 1970s
using too many, governments at all levels have attempted to dictate use
decisions based on the model of a central regulator assessing the situation and
choosing what was "best" for individuals. Those decisions have been largely
made in a vacuum ignoring the impact of other government programs on
pesticide use, with a result of a contradictory mess.
Markets, property rights, and common law offer an alternative way to
think about pesticide policy. Decentralizing decision making and focusing on
incentive effects of government programs can solve some of our problems
with pesticides without the undesirable impacts of the central planning
approach.
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